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Summary  findings
Asset management companies have been used to address  Asset management companies used to dispose of assets
the overhang of bad debt in the financial system. There  rapidly fared somewhat better. Two of four agencies (in
are two main types of asset management company: those  Spain and the United States) achieved their objectives,
set up to expedite corporate restructuring and those  suggesting that asset management companies can be used
established for rapid disposal of assets.  effectively for narrowly defined purposes of resolving
A review of seven asset management companies reveals  insolvent and inviable financial institutions and selling
a mixed record. In two of three cases, asset management  off their assets. Achieving these objectives required an
companies for corporate restructuring  did not achieve  easily liquefiable asset - real estate - mostly
their narrow goal of expediting baiik or corporate  professional management, political independence,
restructuring, suggesting that they are not good vehicles  adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, appropriate
for expediting corporate  restructuring.  funding, skilled resources, good information  and
Only a Swedish asset management company  management systems, and transparent  operations and
successfully managed its portfolio, acting sometimes as  processes.
lead agent in restructuring - and helped by the fact that  The other two agencies (in Mexico and the
the assets acquired had mostly to do with real estate, not  Philippines) were doomed from the start, as governments
manufacturing, which is harder to restructure,  and  transferred  to them politically motivated loans or
represented a small fraction of the banking system's  fraudulent assets, which were difficult for a govern7nent
assets, which made it easier for the company to remain  agency susceptible to political pressure and lacking
independent  of political pressures and to sell assets back  independence to resolve or sell off.
to the private sector.
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1I.  Introduction
In recent decades, many countries have experienced banking problems requiring a major
and  expensive  overhaul  of their  banking  system.  By  one  count,  112 episodes  of  systemic
banking crises occurred in 93 countries since the late  1970s (Caprio, Klingebiel 1999). Bank
restructuring often has to be accompanied by corporate debt restructuring as most of the NPLs
of a banking system in trouble are usually loans to non-financial enterprises which are no longer
able to service their  debt. Countries can adopt either flow or stock  approaches to  resolving
banking distress and the overhang of bad debt in the financial system.
As cross country evidence indicates, stock solutions tend to be necessary, where banking
distress  is  systemic  and  often  include  the  liquidation  of  unviable  banks,  disposal  and
management of impaired assets and the restructuring of viable banks. For the management and
disposal  of  bad  debt,  governments  have  made  extensive  use  of  publicly  owned  asset
management  companies  (AMCs)  that  either dispose  of assets  hived off from  bank  balance
sheets or restructure  corporate debt. AMCs have become very popular including in the recent
East Asian financial crises (see Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 1999). While establishing
AMCs is now an often recommended resolution strategy to manage  and dispose of impaired
assets (for example Dziobeck, Pazarbasioglu 1997), little is known about the effectiveness of
these centralized agencies. The paper below attempts to close this gap and has two objectives:
(i) to analyze on a conceptual basis the advantages and disadvantages of AMCs in managing
and disposing of impaired assets; and (ii) to gauge the effectiveness of such institutions using
cross country experience. It will only focus on this  aspect of systemic bank restructuring and
will not discuss pros and cons of different bank recapitalization strategies including the use of
AMCs as part of that strategy.
Two main  types  of AMCs  can be  distinguished:  AMCs  set  up to  help  and  expedite
corporate restructuring  and AMCs established to dispose of assets acquired/transferred to the
government  during the crisis-rapid  asset  disposition vehicles. According to a  survey of 26
banking crises  (Caprio,  Klingebiel  1997b), centralized AMC  structures were  set up  in  nine
cases. Out  of the  nine, seven cases, where  data was publicly available  for a more thorough
analysis,  were  selected.  In  three  out  of  the  seven  cases  (Finland,  Ghana,  Sweden),  the
government set up restructuring vehicles. In four cases (Mexico, the Philippines, Spain and the
US) governments set up rapid asset disposition agencies.
The results of the analysis of the seven cases can be summarized as follows: Two out of
three corporate restructuring AMCs did not achieve their narrow goals of expediting corporate
restructuring.  These  experiences  suggest  that  AMCs  are  rarely  good  tools  to  accelerate
corporate  restructuring. Only the Swedish AMC successfully managed  its portfolio, acting in
some  instances  as  lead  agent  in  the  restructuring  process.  It was  helped  by  some  special
circumstances, however: the assets acquired were mostly real estate related, not manufacturing
that are harder to restructure, and were a small fraction of the banking system which made it
easier for the AMC to maintain its independence from political pressures and to sell assets back
to the private sector. Rapid asset disposition vehicles fared somewhat better with two out of four
agencies,  namely  Spain  and the  US,  achieving their  objectives. The successful  experiences
suggest that  AMCs  can  be  effectively  used,  but  only  for  the purpose  of  asset  disposition
including  resolving  insolvent  and  unviable  financial  institutions.  But  even achieving  these
objectives required  many  ingredients: a  type  of asset  that  is  easily  liquifiable-real  estate,
2mostly professional management, political independence, a skilled resource base, appropriate
funding,  adequate  bankruptcy  and  foreclosure  laws,  good  inforrnation  and  management
systems, and  transparency  in  operations  and processes.  In the  Philippines and  Mexico, the
success of the AMCs was doomed from the start as governments transferred a large amount of
loans politically motivated loans and/or fraudulent assets to the AMCs which are difficult to be
resolved or to be sold off by a government agency. Both of these agencies did not succeed in
achieving their  narrow objective of asset  disposition, thus  delaying the realignment  of asset
prices.
The  remainder  of  the paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section  II  examines  alternative
strategies  for the handling  of problem  assets in  banking crises used  in  stock  solutions and
compares the decentralized approach of asset management-non-performing  assets are left with
the  individual  bank  to  deal  with-to  the  centralized  approach-non-performing  assets  are
transferred to  a  centrally managed  asset  management company-and  describes the different
types  of  asset  management  companies  - rapid  asset  dLisposition  vehicles  and  restructuring
vehicles  in greater  details.  Section III presents  the analysis of seven  country cases  of asset
management companies. Section V draws some conclusions.
II.  Alternative Strategies for Handling Problem Assets in Banking Crises
-The  Centralized versus the Decentralized Approach-
While there is a growing literature on the do's and don'ts  of banking crisis management
literature,'  empirical  studies in this  area remain sparse." Bank restructuring  seeks to  achieve
many-often  conflicting-goals:  preventing bank runs, avoiding a credit crunch, improving the
efficiency  of the financial intermediation process and aiLtracting  new equity into the banking
industry to economize on claims on the public finances. As Dziobeck (1998) notes the style of
responses has also changed over time. It is therefore not surprising that there is no unique or
optimal blueprint on how to manage systemic banking distress.
On a conceptual basis,  countries can use  either flow or stock  approaches to resolving
banking distress and the overhang of bad debt in the financial system. Whether a country should
adopt a flow or a stock solution depends, among other things, on the degree of distress in the
system and the extent of the official safety net. Flow solutions usually attempt to allow banks to
strengthen  their  capital  base  over  time  through  i ncreased  banking  system  profits-
recapitalization  on  a  flow basis-and  do not  explicitly address  the stock  of  bad  debt in  a
system. 3 Cross country evidence suggests that flow solutions are only successful when banking
distress  is  limited,  i.  e.  non-systemic,  and  the  official  safety  net  is  either  limited  or  the
supervisory authority  is willing to intervene in those institutions whose capital base is further
deteriorating.  For example,  in the  early  1990s, US  money center  banks  enjoyed substantial
forbearance and successfully recapitalized on a flow basis). 4 Contrary to that, stock solutions
' For example,  Sheng 1996, Rojas-Suarez  and Weisbrod 1996,  DziLobeck,  Pazarbasioglu  1997, Goodhardt  et all
(1998);  and Hawkins,  Turner  (1999)  to name  a just a few.
2 Caprio  and Klingebiel  1997a,  Dziobeck  and Pazarbasioglu  (1997).
3  Flow solutions also end up taxing either depositors and/or performing  borrowers as banks would try to
recapitalize  from earnings,  thus interest  rate spreads  would  have  to rise. Flow solutions  are also inherently  risky,  as
decapitalized  banks  have incentives  to gamble  for resurrection  as was  the case in the US savings  and loan crisis.
4 Forbearance  proved  to be less  successful  in the US savings  and loan  crisis and Japan's banking  problems  that
have  continued  for almost 10 years.  Hoshi  and Kashyap  (1999).
3are aimed at either restoring viable but insolvent or marginally solvent institutions to solvency
or liquidating unviable institutions. Stock solutions tend to be necessary in cases where banking
distress is systemic.
The proper management and disposition of impaired assets is one of the most critical and
complex  tasks  of  successful  and  speedy  bank  restructuring.  Successful  asset  management
policies can facilitate bank restructuring by accelerating the resolution of non-performing assets
and can promote corporate restructuring by providing the right incentives for voluntary debt
restructuring.  There  is  an  ongoing  debate  over  the  best  model  for  asset  management  and
recovery:  should  debt  restructuring  and  workout  be  done  by  the  banks  themselves-the
"decentralized model"-or  should bad debt be transferred to a centralized publicly owned asset
management company (Garcia  1997, Claessens  1998, IMF  1999) charged with  resolving the
overhang of impaired assets.
Empirical  studies  and/or cross  country analysis on  the usefulness  and  success of  the
decentralized versus the centralized approach in asset management have yet to be performed.
This paper is intended as a first step in this direction as it will analyze the actual performance of
AMCs given its stated goals, thus providing insight in whether or not AMCs may be a useful
tool  in the management  of distressed  assets. A companion paper looks at the experience of
banking crisis where the responsibility  for the workout of bad debt was mainly left with the
banks (Dado, Klingebiel 2000).
Decentralized  work-out  of  non-performing  loans.  In  general,  banks should  be better
placed to resolve NPLs than centralized AMCs as they have the loan files and some institutional
knowledge of the borrower.  Leaving the problem  assets on banks'  balance sheets may also
provide better incentives for banks to maximize the recovery value of bad debt and avoid future
losses by improving loan approval and monitoring procedures. Leaving NPLs with banks also
has the advantage that these banks can provide new loans in the context of debt restructuring.
Successful  decentralized  debt  workouts  require,  however,  limited  or  no  ownership  links
between banks  and corporates, otherwise the same party would be both  debtor and creditor,
adequately capitalized banks and proper incentives for banks and borrowers. For example, the
very slow speed of restructuring in Japan is in part due to the extensive ownership links among
banks, other financial intermediaries, and corporations (IMF, 1999). Moreover, successful debt
workout by banks requires that financial institutions have sufficient skills and resources to deal
with their problem loans.
A decentralized bad debt work-out can be accomplished by establishing an internal work-
out  unit,  or  "bad  banks"-separately  capitalized-which  are  subsidiaries  of  banks.  Sole
objectives of these units/or bad banks is to  focus attention on the work-out of the assets in a
separate  unit  of  the  financial  institution  and  maximize  the  recovery  rate  through  active
restructuring reducing drains on managerial capacity and improving overall incentives. A clean
break can also help rebuild confidence in failed banks.
But there are also considerable risks associated with private AMCs that are spun off from
individual banks. They  can be  used for "window-dressing"  if assets are transferred at book
value or above market value, i. e. not all losses are not taken at the bank level but  some are
4effectively transferred to another entity. 5 Even if regulations are in place that require financial
institutions to transfer their assets at market value, the supervisory authority needs to have the
powers  and  the  incentives  to  enforce  such  rules.  Permitting  banks  to  establish  separately
capitalized workout units or bad banks, therefore needs to be supported by a well-functioning
regulatory framework, appropriate disclosure and accounting regulations with strong monitoring
and enforcement by the supervisory agency and the market and third party reviews.
The  centralized  approach.  The  centralized  asset  recovery  approach  permits  a
consolidation  of  skills  and  resources-centralization  of  work-out  skills  and  information
technology-in  debt  restructuring  within  one  agency  and  may  thus  be  more  efficient  in
recovering maximum possible value. A centralization can also help with the securitization of
assets as it has a larger pool of assets. It centralizes the ownership of collateral, thus providing
potentially more leverage over debtors and more effective management. Moreover, distressed
loans are removed clearly, quickly and completely from banks allowing them in turn to focus on
their day-to-day activities. 6 Centralized agencies may have also have the advantage of breaking
links between banks and corporates and may thus be better able to collect on connected loans.
Other arguments  that are sometimes  advanced in  favor of a single entity include: improved
prospects  for  orderly  sectoral  restructuring  in  the  real  economy, 7 application  of  uniform
workout practices,  and  easier  government monitoring  and supervision  of workout practices.
Finally, a centralized agency can be given special legal powers to expedite loan recovery and
bank restructuring. 8
A  centralized workout  unit  may, however,  also  face problems related to  its  size and
ownership structure. If the agency carries a large portion of banking system assets, it may be
difficult for the government to insulate such an entity from political pressure especially in cases
where the government  is also charged with the restructuring of the assets and where a  large
portion of banking system assets has been transferred. Moreover, a transfer of loans can break
the links  between banks  and  corporations,  links that may have positive  value given banks'
privileged  access  to  corporate  information. 9 If  AMC  assets  are not  actively  managed,  the
existence  of  a  public  AMC  could  lead  to  a  general wleakening of  credit  discipline in  the
financial system and lead to a further deterioration of asset values.
5  For example,  if the bank is not subject  to consolidated  supervision,  it can  transfer  the problem  assets  at book
value  and "hide"  the losses  as the  AMC's  balance  sheet  is not consolidated  with  that of the bank. Or even  if the
accounts  are consolidated,  they  may  be obscured.  For example,  the bank  may  take a minority  position  (to avoid
consolidation  at the  bank  level)  and  may  ask  connected  companies  to put  up  the  rest of  the  equity.
6 Nevertheless,  it is also argued  that a reasonable  amount  of small-sized  problem  loans  should  remain  within  the
bank's ordinary  organization,  even  if the bulk  of bad assets  are transferred  to a separate  AMC.  Apart  from  the
argument  of maintaining  a level  playing  field  among  the remaining  banks,  leaving  some  non-performing  assets  in
the  banks  will  preserve  their  capability  to work  out loans  that  do  not require  special  expertise.  Also  the transaction
cost incurred  by transferring  small  assets  may outweigh  any potential  gains.  See for more  detail: Ingves/Lind
(1996).
' The idea here is to use the AMC as a tool for industrial policy. This imay,  however, be tricky for two reasons: (i) it
is not necessarily obvious that the government has better information than the private sector about overcapacity and
future growth areas; and (ii) involving government agencies provides scope for political interference.
a Special  powers,  however,  may not compensate  for a weak  judicial system  and thus may prove less  useful  if they
have  to be enforced  by the  judicial  system.
9  However,  the value of such information  depends  on the viability  of the corporates  they have been  lending  to.
5Countries have employed variants of the above techniques to deal with asset and debt
recovery.  For either  solution-centralized  or decentralized management  of  assets-,  a  legal
framework that facilitates the workout will be  a key element in influencing the final costs of
bank restructuring (Waxman  1998). A good bargaining position for the holder of the asset and
power  to  act  are  essential  factors  for  the  management  of  non-perforning  loans.  Well
functioning legal procedures and good access to courts are therefore crucial. Equally important
are laws that facilitate actions by the banks or AMCs to exercise claims on assets and to recover
the proceeds of sales  of such assets if debt is not serviced. Moreover, for asset management
companies to maximize returns, it is of particular importance that they have access to a clean
title and do not require the borrower's consent to the sale of the assets.
Box 1:  Advantages and disadvantages of a centralized public AMC
Advantages
*  Economies  of scale-i.  e. consolidation  of scarce  work  out skills and resources  within  one agency.
*  Can help with the securitization  of assets  as it has a larger  pool of assets.
*  Centralizes  ownership  of collateral,  thus providing  (potentially)  more  leverage  over debtors  and
more  effective  management.
*  Breaks links between  banks  and corporates  and thus could  potentially  improve  the collectibility  of
loans.
*  Allows  banks  to focus on core business.
*  Improves  prospects  for orderly  sectoral  restructuring  of economy.
*  Allows  the application  of uniform  workout  practices.
*  Can be given special  powers  to expedite  loan  recovery  and bank restructuring.
Disadvantages
*  Banks have informational  advantages  over AMCs  as they have collected  information  on their
borrowers.
*  Leaving loans in banks may  provide  better incentives  for recovery-and for avoiding  future  losses
by improving  loan approval  and monitoring  procedures.
*  Banks  can provide  additional  financing  which may  be necessary  in the restructuring  process.
*  If assets  transferred  to the AMCs  are not actively  managed,  the existence  of an AMC may lead  to a
general  deterioration  of payment  discipline  and further  deterioration  of asset values.
*  It may be difficult  to insulate  a public agency  against  political  pressure  especially  if it carries  large
portion of banking  system  assets.
The Different  Types of Asset Management  Companies
There are mainly  two types of centralized asset management companies: (i) asset disposition
vehicles including liquidation vehicles and (ii) longer term restructuring vehicles. Whereas the
typical objective  of asset  disposition and liquidation agencies is to  sell the assets promptly,
through bulk sales or securitizations-for  asset disposition and liquidation agencies)-and  via
purchase & assumption transactions-for  liquidation agencies-restructuring  agencies tend to
have different sets of objectives.
Asset disposition  agencies. Centralized asset sale agencies are set up to dispose of particular
classes of assets that by nature tend to be more easily liquifiable-real  estate assets, commercial
real estate loans, secured loans that can be either easily sold off or securitized in case of a deep
6capital  market-and  that  were  transferred  to  the  AMC  during  a  bank  restructuring  and/or
recapitalization exercise. To maintain value, assets need to be managed. Even good loans tend
to lose value when they are taken from the originating bank unless the AMC monitors them
actively.1 0 Otherwise even good borrowers may fail to service their loans.  The management of
the assets can either be performed by the AMC itself, or can be outsourced to the private sector
or by the originating bank if it is still in operation. In that case, a loss sharing arrangement with
the  AMC  could  provide  incentives  for  the  bank  to  monitor/manage the  assets properly.11
Liquidation agencies are set up to resolve failed financial institutions including selling of their
assets  through  P&As,  insured  deposit transfers,  as  well as  deposit payoff  and  sale of  the
performing or non-performing assets that cannot be sold in P&A transactions.
Restructuring  agencies.  Restructuring agencies are usually set up on a longer term basis and
are aimed at restructuring  and  liquidating NPLs of non-viable  borrowers prior  to their sale.
Typically,  as a first  step in the restructuring  process, the assets transferred to the AMC are
grouped  either  into viable  claims that need  to be restructured  or into non-viable  claims for
which borrowers will be forced into bankruptcy.12  The overall objective of the AMC, if it is
pursuing  a  commercial  objective,  usually is to  make  the assets  financially  viable  and thus
attractive for a buyer.  The restructuring of viable assets can include-in  case of an industrial
company-selling  off non-core assets and  improving the overall efficiency of operations by
reorganizing and reducing staff, cutting other costs, restructuring product lines, etc. In case of
commercial real  estate  and residential homes,  measures to increase the attractiveness of the
properties can include renovation of the properties to adapt them to current market demand or
reducing  the  vacancy  ratio,  which  is  a  crucial  factor  in  improving  the  cash-flow.  As
restructuring often requires new lending, the AMC needs to have the capacity to lend.'3 After
the restructuring process is completed, assets are sold to investors in various ways.
Ownership Structure.  Large privately held centralized AMCs are rare. If a substantial amount
of bad  loans  and  assets  were  transferred  to  an  AMC,  i:  is usually  difficult to  find private
investors willing to assume the ownership of such an AMC without requiring far reaching state
guarantees covering the future value of the asset portfolio. In that case, the government may be
in a more favorable position if it owns the AMC rather than providing such guarantees since it
might then benefit from any upward price movement of AMC assets. Moreover, under such a
scenario, it may be difficult to structure the guarantee in such a way that it preserves the private
owners'  incentives to sell the assets at best prices. Public ownership could also be warranted if
the value of impaired assets could be destroyed through "fire sale" liquidations. In that instance,
the gradual sale by a specialized public agency may be better able to preserve the asset value.
The timing  of assets sales. The warehousing of assets in the hopes of obtaining higher prices
later may not prevent prices from tumbling since the future supply of assets will be discounted
in current prices (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Lang, Poulsen and Stulz 1995). This is especially
'0  To fulfill  this role, the AMC  need to set up internal  information  and operations  systems  and procedures  and  need
to track  assets  and catalogue  them.
"  In the Mexican case, the management  of the assets was left with the originating  banks. Despite loss-sharing
agreements  aimed  at incentivizing  the originating  bank  to continue  to manage  the assets  properly,  assets  transferred
to the AMCs were managed  inadequately  resulting  in a further deteriDration  of asset values.  This suggests  that it
may not be an easy undertaking  to develop  incentive  compatible  contracts  to prevent  this from happening.
12 To increase transparency and depoliticize the process, these assessments should be done by third parties.
13  For more detail see: Ingves/Lind  1996.
7the case for real estate assets, where fire sale losses need not imply an economic loss of value.
At the same time,  selling assets rapidly establishes floor prices that will promote a speedier
recovery from the economic crisis. This may especially be so for public AMCs which typically
have limited market insights.
Evaluating the success of centralized AMCs. The success of centralized AMCs can be assessed
on two dimensions: (i) Did they achieve their narrow objectives for which they were set up; and
(ii) at a broader level, did the banking system return to  solvency, did banking problems not
reappear, and did credit extension resume as banks are presumably cleaned up and the problem
of recuperating bad loans is decoupled from the business of making fresh loans.'4
Narrow  objectives of AMCs.  The success of rapid asset disposition and liquidation agencies
will be measured by the speed of asset disposition. Here, an AMC is judged to be successful if
assets, including banks, are disposed of rapidly that is within a five year timeframe. In the case
of restructuring agencies it is more difficult to gauge whether they have indeed achieved their
narrow objectives of accelerating corporate restructuring-because  of the dearth  of data and
lack of the counterfactual.  Thus, they will be considered successful if they sold off 50 percent
of their assets within a five year time frame, indicating that the existence of a public AMC did
not delay corporate restructuring.
Broader  objectives.  To  assess  whether  AMCs  accomplished  their  broader  objectives  of
restoring the banking system back to health, two criteria are used: (i) did the financial system/or
bank experience repeated financial distress; and (ii) did real credit to the private sector resume
and was aggregate credit growth positive in real terms?
II.  Cross Country Experience
Sample Selection  and Information Sources.  While setting up  centralized asset management
companies has become  a popular component of banking distress resolution strategies in the
recent East Asian financial crises-Indonesia,  Malaysia and Korea all set up centralized AMC
structures-they  were  a  less frequently  used tool in  the past.  According to  a  survey of 26
banking crises 15, centralized AMC structures were only set up in nine cases. AMCs proved to be
particularly popular in Africa as four out of the nine AMCs were launched in Africa.,6 Out of
these nine, seven  cases, where  sufficient data was publicly available, were selected for more
detailed  analysis. In  four out  of the seven  cases (Mexico  1994; Philippines  1981-86, Spain
1977-85; US  1984-91); the governments set up rapid asset disposition vehicles, and  in three
cases  (Finland  1991-94;  Ghana  1982-89;  Sweden  1991-94)  restructuring  agencies  were
established. As data sources, published reports, Annual Reports of AMCs if available or World
Bank reports, or interviews with experts familiar with the individual cases were employed.
14  Some facilities also pursued the explicit objective to minimize  fiscal costs. However, as we do not have
information  as to the counterfactual,  we cannot  evaluate  whether  AMCs  have  achieved  that  objective.
15 Caprio/Klingebiel  1996.
16 Benin, Cote d'  Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal all set up centralized  AMCs as part of their bank restructuring
mechanisms.  The other  cases were Finland,  Philippines,  Spain,  the US,  and Uruguay.
8Structure of Analysis.  The analysis is structured as follows. In a first step, objectives and the
main characteristics of the AMCs are briefly laid out including the amount of assets transferred
relative to banking system assets, the sectoral breakdown of assets, criteria authorities used for
the transfer of assets (if any)  and the transfer price. Then, the attempt is made to  gauge the
success  of those  entities and analyze key  factors for the success andlor impediments to the
success of the AMC structure.
Except  for the US, all banking systems in the sample suffered from  systemic banking
system crisis, i. e. the aggregate banking system's  capital had been exhausted (see Annex for
more  details  on  crises).  In  all  country cases,  the financial  sector restructuring  mechanisms
adopted by authorities included the setting up of a centralized AMC structure.
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the share of banking system assets transferred to AMCs in the
seven country case studies. While the comparability of the data across countries may be limited
due to differences in accounting standards, the figure nevertheless illustrates that the share of
financial system assets managed by the respective AMCs as a result of the asset transfers varied
widely among the  countries.  Both  as a  share of  assets to  total  system  assets but  also as a
percentage of GDP, the Philippine AMC had to deal with the largest share of NPLs as assets
transferred amounted to almost 22 percent of financial system assets and 18 percent of GDP. At
the other end of the spectrum, Spain's  AMCs had to deal with  only  1.0 percent  of financial
system assets which was equivalent to  1.3 percent of GDIP.  With the exception of the US case,
all assets transferred to the AMCs had been previously classified as non-performing.
9Figure 2 provides preliminary information on the scope of the financial sector crisis in the
seven countries by providing  information on the peak level  of non-performing  loans in the
financial system. Since the level of non-performing loans is a reflection of the performance of
the real  sector, this  number can also  be used  as a rough proxy  for the  extent of corporate
distress. Spain and the US  were the only countries in the sample, where the extent of non-
performing loans in the system remained limited, i. e. below ten percent  as a share of gross
loans. In the Philippines and Finland, official NPLs reached substantial proportion accounting
for over or close to 20 percent of financial system assets.'7 In Ghana, more than half of banking
system  loans  were  non-performing.  In  the  Mexican  case,  it  should  be  noted that  official
numbers recorded the level of NPLs at around  11 percent of banking system loans. However,
non-performing assets transferred to Fobaproa amounted to 23 percent of financial system loans
or 17 percent of financial system assets at end 1996.
Figure 2 Magnitude of Crisis and Resolution Costs
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Source: Caprio  and Klingebiel  (1999)  and IMF, International  Financial  Statistics.
1.  Cross Country Experience with Rapid Asset Disposition Agencies'8
Table  1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the four country examples
with  rapid  asset  disposition  vehicles.  Two  of the  agencies-the  Mexican  and  the  Spanish
AMCs-were  housed in an existing public agency, the Deposit Guarantee Agency. Contrary to
this, the Philippine and the US agencies were set up as stand alone agencies with a limited life
17 As the  accounting conventions differ among the countries in the sample, these figures should be treated with
caution,  Among the countries, Spain, the US, Finland and Sweden have stricter classification regulation compared
to Ghana, Mexico and the Philippines.
is It should be noted that the analysis of the Mexican rapid asset disposition agency Fobaproa reflects available
information until the end of 1998.
10span. All four agencies pursued similar objectives. The rmain goal of Fobaproa (Mexico), the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund and the US RTC was to
dispose of the assets that were transferred to them as fast as possible while maximizing the
recovery value of the assets. APT was solely focusing on the disposition of non-performing
assets that had been transferred in a one off transaction. In contrast, Fobaproa was also involved
in the clean up and  recapitalization  of the banks that  were still in operation,  as assets were
purchased by  Fobaproa  at above fair market value, and continued to  acquire assets through
several rounds of loan purchases in exchange for government securities. By end 1997, the assets
to be disposed of by Fobaproa  amounted to  17 percent of banking system assets compared to
22 percent on ATP's  books.'9 The Spanish Guarantee Fund and the RTC operated as centralized
liquidiation  agencies  and  as  such they  were  responsible for  resolving  financial institutions
including their liabilities that had been previously taken over or were  intervened in-through
different mechanisms. Moreover, the amount of bad debt that was effectively managed and sold
by these  entities was small relative  to financial  system assets;  1 percent in  the case of the
Spanish agency and 8.0 percent in the US case.
Evaluating Success.  Fobaproa and ATP did not achieve their narrow objective of rapid asset
disposition. By  early  1999, four years  after it had  been established, Fobaproa  only sold 0.5
percent of its assets and APT still has 50 percent of its original assets on its book twelve years
after it started operations. In both cases, rapid asset sales were  not hampered by negative or
sluggish GDP growth (Table 2) as GDP growth was positive. Rather, the disposition efforts of
these agencies were hampered by a variety of reasons (see Table 1) most important of which
was  the  type  of  assets  transferred  (politically  motivated  and/or  fraudulent  loans).  As
government  agencies  with  limited  independence  and  susceptible  to  political  pressure,  both
agencies were  not  equipped  to  resolving assets whose initial  extension was based more on
political  connections  than due  diligence on the merits of the projects to  be financed.  Asset
disposition  was  also  hampered  by  a  weak  legal  framework. For  example,  in  Mexico, the
government,  at  the  time  of  asset  transfer,  had  restricted  financial  institutions,  including
Fobaproa, from foreclosing on assets. Moreover, the rapid sale of assets was further hindered by
the fact that the agency  was insufficiently funded. As assets were transferred from banks at
above market values, the disposition of these assets would have revealed the true losses of the
banking  system.  Finally,  the  considerable  amount  of  irnpaired assets  under  FOBAPROA's
ownership  impeded  effective  corporate  restructuring in  at least  three ways:  (i) it  depressed
market value of bank assets generally; (ii) continued government control of such a large share of
total  indebtness  encouraged  continued  politicization  of  asset  restructuring process;  and  (iii)
repeated  non-performing  asset  sales  limited  banks'  incentives  to  engage  in  corporate
restructuring.
Contrary to that, the Spanish and the US agencies met their narrow objectives as both of
them disposed of 50 percent of assets within the five year time period. The Spanish Guarantee
Fund and the RTC, after some initial problems, were successful in developing fair, credible and
transparent processes and mechanisms for the resolution and sale of financial institutions and
managed to sell those institutions in a relatively short period of time minimizing disruptions for
depositors  and borrowers  (Sheng  1996; GAO  1997). One key  factor for the  success of the
Spanish Deposit  Guarantee Fund was that the banks thal: were to be resolved were relatively
small, which  may  have made  it politically  easier to  deal with  them.  Moreover, the  largest
'9 Further  details  of the respective  AMCs  can be found  in  the Annex.
11commercial banks in the system were sound enough to assist substantially in the resolution of
the  small banks.  The  RTC's  success was helped by  the fact  that most  of  the assets to  be
disposed of were real estate loans/or assets or mortgage loans that could relatively easily be
bundled and  securitized  or  sold via bulk  sales. Moreover,  a  deep and  sophisticated capital
market and a recovery in the real estate market also proved advantageous for the RTC as did an
effective organizational and governance structure and skilled personnel. Despite succeeding in
selling the 26 banks, the Spanish Guarantee fund proved to be less successful in disposing of the
assets that had been carved out prior to the sale of the institutions, and part of the assets remain
with the Fund even today. Despite an overall benign macro-environment and rising real estate
prices, asset disposition  was hampered by an inadequate legal framework and administrative
obstacles  (Table  2).  For  examples,  the  fund did  not have  the  legal title  or  they  were not
registered for some of the real estate assets.
Both Fobaproa and APT were also not successful in achieving their broader objectives, i.
e. helping to build a more robust banking system as the Mexican banking system remains weak
and one of the two banks that were cleaned up in the Philippine case appears to be in financial
distress again. In addition, Fobaproa's  repeated loan purchases at Mexican banks coupled with
debt relief  for borrowers, led to  a general  deterioration of the payment  discipline and asset
prices. Moreover,  loan growth did not recover and remained strongly negative in Mexico. In
contrast, banking sector solvency problems did neither reoccur in Spain nor in the US.
Table 2 GDP and Real Credit Growth
GDP  growth  (in percent)  Real  credit  growth  (in percent)
Year of AMC  One year  Year of  One year  Two years One year  Year of  One year  Two years
establishment  prior  set up  after  after  prior  set up  after  after
Finland  1993  -3.55  -1.18  4.55  5.06  -8.95  -10.59  -10.63  -3.82
Ghana  1990  5.09  3.32  5.31  3.89  100.44  -16.73  -20.55  41.76
Mexico  1995  4.42  -6.17  5.18  6.71  27.93  -30.70  -36.70  19.56
Philippines  1987  3.42  4.31  6.75  6.21  -21.12  17.04  5.26  11.41
Spain  *  1980  0.04  1.30  -0.18  1.57  -0.60  2.20  2.00  2.79
Sweden  1992  -1.66  -1.42  -2.22  3.34  -9.21  -2.38  -23.06  -6.23
USA  1989  3.82  3.36  1.23  -0.93  5.63  5.35  0.23  -2.10
Source:  IMF, International  Financial  Statistics.  * For Spain:  Year when  the Deposit  Guarantee  Fund  was  granted  legal
powers  for bank restructuring.
12Table 1 Rapid Asset Disposition  Agencies
Rapid Asset Disposition  Objectives  of Rapid Asset  Asset  Transfer  Outcome  Key Factors
..........  . _  . Disposition  Agency  -_--------
Mexico:  *  Clean up and  *  Amounts  of Assets  Transferred:  *  Transfer  of loans did not succeed in  Favorable Factors:
FOBAPROA  restructure  banks.  P142 billion (P119 billion net of  restoring the banking  system to solvency as  *  Strong economic recovery.
*  Set up in 1995;  *  Sell off or recover  reserves for loan losses)  equivalent  capital deficiency  was underestimated  and
continues to  assets  as quickly as  to 17%  of banking system assets.  institutions remained  weak  even after  Unfavorable  Factors:
operate. No pre-  possible,  through  *  Sectoral Breakdown  of Assets:  repeated  rounds of loan repurchases  at  *  Type of asset transferred, i. e. politically connected loans
established  auction, securitization,  NPLs transferred included  above market price. Moreover,  operational  assets that are difficult  to handle for a government  agency
duration  limit,  or other market  consumer, mortgage  and corporate  restructuring  remained  limited  and bank  susceptible to political  pressure.
*  Public ownership.  mechanisms.  loans.  management  was left unchanged.  *  Lack of independence  and weak governance  as FOBAPROA
*  Centralized entity.  (Management and  *  Criteria for Asset Transfer: Non-  *  As weaknesses  in the banking  sector  was not separately managed  but was under central  bank
*  FOBAPROA  set  administration  of  transparent and repeated  process  remained,  loan growth  did not recover and  management. Moreover, policy decisions  were made by
up as bank  assets until then sale  led to perceptions  that some of the  remained  strongly  negative.  technical  committee  comprising  the minister  of finance, the
restructuring  was left with the  banks received  more favorable  *  By end 1998,  FOBAPROA  had sold only  central  bank govemor and the president  of the financial
agency.  banks.)  treatment than others.  0.5% of transferred  assets. The huge  supervisory  body.
*  Asset Price:  Transfer at book  value  overhang  of impaired assets  under  *  Substantial deficiencies  in bankruptcy  and foreclosure  code;
as assets were not valued prior to  FOBAPROA's  ownership impeded  moreover,  at the time that assets  were transferred  to
transfer.  effective  restructuring in at least three ways:  FOBAPROA,  the govemment  restricted financial
(i) it depressed market value of bank assets  institutions, including  FOBAPROA,  from foreclosing  on
generally;  (ii) continued  govemment control  assets.
of such large share of total indebtness  *  Insufficient  funding  of FOBAPROA.  Sale  of assets  would
encouraged  continued politicization  of asset  have revealed the size of banking system losses.
restructuring  process; and (iii) repeated  non-
performing  asset sales limited  banks'
incentives  to engage in corporate
restructuring.
Philippines:  *  Orderly  and fast  *  Amounts of Assets Transferred:  *  ATP did not reach its objective  of "orderly  Favorable Factors:
Asset Privatization  Trust  transfer of non-  Assets of about P108 billion  and fast transfer" of assets to private  sector  *  Strong  economic recovery.
(APT)  performing  assets to  equivalent  to 21.7 percent of  as 40 to 50 percent of assets  remain in
*  Set up in 1987,  the private sector.  banking  system assets.  APT's portfolio to date, including  those of  Unfavorable  Factors:
intended  to 'be  *  Administration  of the  *  Sectoral Breakdown  of assets:  the largest account, i.e., Nationai  *  t ype of asset transferred,  i. e. politically connected loans
closed in 1991.  assets  pending  Everything  from mining  ventures,  Construction  Corporation,  despite  and/or fraudulent  assets  that are difficult  to handle for a
Still in operation.  disposal.  ships, textile plants and food  conducive  macro-economic  environment.  government agency  susceptible  to political pressure.
*  Public ownership.  *  In 1991,  APT was also  processing  to luxury hotel resorts;  *  One of the recapitalized  banks again faced  *  Rapid asset disposition  was severely  hampered by legal
*  Set up as  charged with  70 percent of value was held in 15  solvency  problems in the late 1990s.  problems  despite the fact that APT had temporary  extra-
centralized  stand  divestiture of very  percent of assets;  75 percent of  Nevertheless,  credit growth  rebounded  judicial powers
alone entity.  large  govemment  assets constituted  financial claims  relatively  strongly.  *  In addition, weak governance  and insufficient funding.  APT
corporations.  for which foreclosure  procedures  was neither privately managed  nor an independent  agency
had not been completed.  and budgetary  pressures, i. e. avoidance to reveal losses,
*  Criteria for Asset  Transfer: Size  reduced APT's commitment  towards rapid sale.
and nature of accounts (i.  e. non-  *  While APT had to submit  quarterly  reports on performance
performing);  potential for sale; and  and financial  status to the President  and Congress, it did not
any special expertise required  for  disclose  any information  on its activities  and financial
disposition  of the assets.  situation to the public and the process of asset sales remained
*  Transfer  Price: Book value.  non-transparent.
1  3Rapid Asset Disposition  Objectives  of Rapid Asset  Asset Transfer  Outcome  Key Factors
Disposition Agency
Spain:  *  Restructure  banks for  *  Amounts of Assets  Transferred:  *  Successful in selling intervened  banks in  Favorable Factors:
Deposit Guarantee Fund  prompt resale by  Fund took over 26 banks  with  relatively  short period of time upon  . Fund operated as independent  public agency  under
*  Set up in 1977  and  carving out bad assets  assets  amounting to I percent of  acquisition. Banks were sold offon  average  private law with appropriate  funding and had
still in existence.  that new investors  financial system assets. These  within one year, indicating  that Deposit  appropriate powers (could change  management
Was given legal  were unwilling  to take  banks were restructured  and then  Guarantee Fund managed  to accelerate  the  immediately,  purchase assets, offer guarantees or
capacity in 1980 to  on.  sold off to new investors. In some  bank restructuring  process.  counter-guarantees  on behalf  of restructured  banks,
assume bank  *  Prompt sale of carved  instances, large  amount of assets  *  Moreover,  banks  resumed lending in 1980,  grant long-term loans at subsidized  rates or permit
ownership to  out assets with the aim  were taken off bank balance sheet  and credit to the private sector by banks  temporary regulatory  forbearance)  for resolving
initiate bank  of maximum recovery  and remained for rapid asset  grew in real terms.  institutions.
restructuring.  value.  disposition in Guarantee Fund.  *  However,  the Fund was much less  *  Banks to be resolved were small banks  which made it
Had no pre-  Sectoral Breakdown  of Assets:  successful  in achieving  its aim of "rapid  "politically  easier" to resolve and the Fund was not
established  Real estate: 8.2 percent; other  disposal of bad assets" that had been carved  involved in resolution  of political sensitive RUMASA
duration  limit.  assets: 72.5 percent;  out from banks' balance sheets.  group.
*  Public ownership.  shareholdings:  19.4  percent.  . Fund was not involved  in resolution  of20  . The largest commercial  banks  in the system were sound
*  No stand alone  *  Criteria for Asset Transfer: Assets  small and medium size banks of the Rumasa  enough to assist substantially  in resolving  the small
entity but part of  that acquirers  of banks were  groups. Due to the scope of the problems  of'  banks albeit under considerable  state pressure.  Also,
entity set up to  unwilling  to take on.  the Rumasa  group, the govemment  decided  competition in the home market from foreign banks
resolve failed  to nationalize  the banks and the 200  provided incentive for Spain's private banks to acquire
banks.  industrial  firms belonging  to the group. The  recapitalized  banks sometimes  even assuming losses.
government  adopted a two pronged strategy:  *  In tenns of disposition of non-performing  assets,
(i) take over control of companies and (ii)  amount of those assets  small (I percent of banking
resale  of the companies as soon as possible.  system assets).
*  Overall, benign macro-environment.
Unfavorable  Factors:
*  The framework  for foreclosures  and seizures  of
collateral  was deficient  and impeded rapid sale of assets.
*  Moreover Deposit  Guarantee  Fund encountered
problems  with transfer of titles.
*  Lackluster  demand for real estate assets.
14Rapid  Asset  Disposition  Objectives  of Rapid  Asset  Asset  Transfer  Outcome  Key Factors
Disposition  Agency
USA:  *  Social  as  well as  *  Amounts  of Assets  Transferred:  . Yes. RTC  successful  in resolving  747  Favorable  Factors:
Resolution  Trust  commercial:  RTC  was  RTC  resolved  747  thrifts  with total  thrifts and  disposing  of assets  that were  . Amount  of assets  transferred  were  relatively  small  (8.5 Corporation  to maximize  the  net  assets  of US$  465 billion. These  carved  out prior to  bank  sale.  percent  of financial  system  assets)  and  a  large  part  of Set  up in 1989,  value  proceeds  from  assets  accounted  for roughly  23.2  *  Overall,  RTC  recovered  87  cents  to  the  those  assets  were  performing.  Moreover,  it should  also RTC  was to  S&L crisis resolution,  percent  of S&L's assets  or 8  dollar.  be  noted  that S&L problem  affected  only  a fraction  of operate  until  but also  had  a  broader  percent  of total bank  and  thrift  the US  financial  system  leaving  sound  institutions  in the 1996.  It ended  mandate  of minimizing  assets  in 1989.  Of these,  RTC  sold  market  as  potential  buyer  of the assets.
operations  in  the  impact  on  local  US$  153  billion through  asset  *  The  type  of assets  - as  mostly  performing  real  estate 1995.  real  estate  and  disposition,  not  connected  to the  related  assets  and  consumer  loan  assets  were  transferred
*  Public  ownership.  financial  markets,  and  sale  of the financial  institution.  - could  be  sold  offthrough  wholesale  disposition
*  No stand  alone  of maximizing  *  Sectoral  Breakdown  of Assets:  mechanisms  (bulk sales,  securitization  and  auctions).
entity  but part  of  available  and  RTC  acquired  performing  and  . Deep  and  sophisticated  capital  markets. entity set  up  to  affordable  housing  for  non-performing  assets;  sectoral  *  Adequate  govemance  structures;  professional
resolve  failed  low to moderate  breakdown  of assets  transferred:  management  and  extensive  use  of private  sector banks.  income  individuals.  42% mortgage  loans;  7%  real  contractors  for asset  disposition.  RTC  relied  on a
estate;  8%  other  loans;  35%  cash  detailed  set  of directives  and  guidelines  to  its staff and
& securities;  8%  other  assets.  contractors  that  covered  a  wide  range  of operations,
*  Criteria  for Asset  Transfer:  including  asset  management  and  disposition,  contract
Insolvency  of the  financial  policies,  bidding  procedures  and  marketing.  While  this
institution  as  determined  by  the  reduced  RTC's  flexibility in handling  individual  cases,
Central  Bank.  they minimized  the  possibility  of fraud  and  made  policy
and  cost  evaluation  more  transparent  and  expedited
resolution  process.
*  Effective  organizational  structure  including  information
management  systems  that can  handle  large  amount  of
information  and  management  of assets  which  allowed
RTC  to collect  31%  of the  total assets  transferred  and
reduced  by  one  third  the  amount  of assets  needed  to be
sold.
Unfavorable  Factors:
*  Sporadic  funding  of RTC  (several  pieces  of legislation
were  required  to approve  funding)  hampered  speedy
resolution  of failed  S&Ls  and  increased  resolution  costs.
*  Rapid  asset  disposition  was  hampered  by  inconsistent
objectives  of agency.  In addition  to cost  minimization
and  expeditious  disposition  objective,  the  RTC  was  also
supposed  to structure  and  time its asset  sales  to
minimize  any  impact  on  local  real  estate  and  financial
markes.
152.  Cross Country Experience with Restructuring Agencies
Arsenal  in Finland, NPart in Ghana, and  Securum in Sweden were restructuring
agencies  for  non-performing  assets  of  banks  that  were  either  still  in  operation  and
recapitalized through the purchase of loan program at above fair market value-Ghana-
or of banks that needed to be cleaned up prior to their sale to new investors-Finland  and
Sweden-(see  Table  3). The narrow objective of all three entities was to  manage and
liquidate non-performing assets and accelerate corporate restructuring
Evaluating Success. Securum, the Swedish asset management agency was successful in
achieving its narrow objective of restructuring and/or selling off the assets in a relatively
brief period of time and may have expedited restructuring in the broad real estate sector
by acting in some cases as a lead agent enhancing creditor coordination (Bergren 1998).
It closed its doors in  1997, five years after it had been established having sold off 98
percent of its assets. The following factors contributed to the success of Securum. Firstly,
the government transferred mostly commercial real estate assets which may be easier to
restructure  as  they  may  involve  politically  less  sensitive  issues-layoff  of  factory
workers. Secondly, the  assets that were transferred to Securum were mostly large and
complicated  assets  for  which  it  could  be  argued  that  Securum  may  have  had  a
comparative  advantage  of resolving them.  Thirdly, the  government only  transferred a
limited  amount  of  total  banking  system  assets.  Securum total  assets  amounted  to  8
percent  of  total  banking  system  assets.  In  addition,  Securum  had  professional
management, enjoyed political independence and was provided with appropriate funding.
Finally, the economy and the real estate market recovered over that period (Table 2).
Arsenal had disposed of more than 50 percent of assets after five years in operation,
and  thus did not  appear to have delayed  corporate restructuring. Yet,  it is difficult to
gauge whether the agency was an important agent in corporate restructuring and indeed
accelerated  the  process.  Factors  that  worked  in  Arsenal's  favor  were  the  following.
Firstly, Arsenal only had to resolve a relatively small amount of banking system assets as
assets transferred arnounted to 5.2% of banking system assets. Secondly, a large amount
of the assets transferred were loans to real estate or loans secured by real estate. Thirdly,
Arsenal  was provided  with  appropriate  funding,  had professional  management  and  a
skilled human resource base. And finally asset resolution and disposition may have been
helped by a strong economic recovery as the economy expanded at 4 and 5.1 percent in
1994 and 95. On the negative side, because Arsenal had received NPLs regardless of type
and  size of  asset,  it may  have  been more  difficult for  the  agency to  use  wholesale
divestiture techniques and also required it to build up expertise in different areas.
Contrary to Securum and Arsenal, N-PART did not achieve its narrow objective of
performing a substantial role in the restructuring of the corporate sector and expediting
the restructuring  process. In the end, the agency engaged mostly in  cosmetic financial
restructuring  extending  maturity,  and  lowering  interest  rates  and  functioned  as  a
collection agency. Factors that contributed to that outcome were the fact that the agency
lacked political  independence and professional management at the highest level of the
institution.  In  addition,  N-Part  not  only  had  to  resolve  a  large  share  of  outstanding
banking system assets but also more than 50 percent of assets transferred were loans to
state-owned enterprises, assets that are typically difficult to restructure for a government
16agency lacking independence. Importantly, the work of N-Part was hampered by a weak
legal framework. The government attempted to mitigate the implications of a weak legal
framework for N-Part by granting it legal super-powers. Yet, this strategy proved largely
ineffective because the courts were debtor friendly and N-Part needed the approval of the
borrower before it could proceed with the liquidation process.
The track record of all three institutions regarding achieving their broader goal is
mixed, at best. Sweden and Finland did not record any renewed banking system distress
but real credit to the private sector contracted significantly in both countries in the years
that followed the establishment of the AMCs, indicating, that the restructuring of banks
was not  yet complete  (Table 2). While  banks'  lending to  the private  sector increased
significantly in Ghana, state-owned commercial banks, that had been cleaned up through
the loan purchase program, again appeared to experience problems in the mid 1990s.
17Table 3: Restructuring  Agencies
Restructuring  Objectives of  Asset Transfer  Outcome  Key Factors
Restructuring Agency
Fir,land:  *  Established  as a  *  Amounts of Assets  Transferred:  *  At end 1997,  Arsenal  still managed 46.5  Favorable  factors:
Arsenal:  clean up mechanism  Assets  transferred  had a book  percent of the assets  that were transferred  *  Large  amount of real assets  transferred, including
*  Began activities  in  for the Savings  value of FIM 42.9 billion.  to it.  client  receivables  made it easier  to restructure  and/or
1993 and is still in  Bank and Skopbank.  *  Sectoral Breakdown  of Assets:  *  By end 1997,  Arsenal had disposed of 78  dispose as they are less "politically" sensitive issues
operation. Expected  *  Manage, restructure  Only non-performing  loans were  percent of the real estate assets  it had taken  involved  (real  estate considered  more to be cyclical
to close in year  and liquidate NPLs  transferred;  real estate assets  over.  industry)
2000. Set up to  and other holdings,  amounted to 34%; client  *  Unclear  to what extent Arsenal accelerated  *  Appropriate  funding  allowed Arsenal  to mark assets  to
absorb non-  in an orderly manner  receivables 41%; assets  under  corporate restructuring  and how active  market value after transfer.
performing assets.  and at minimum  management  and other assets 25.  Arsenal  was in corporate restructuring..  *  Arsenal's professional  management  and adequate
*  Public ownership.  cost.  3 percent.  *  Real lending to the private sector remained  skilled resources.
*  Stand-alone  entity.  *  Criteria for Asset  Transfer: All  strongly negative in real  terms in the years  *  Benign macro-environment.  In 1994-95,  real GDP
non-performing  assets  were  after the establishment  of Arsenal.  rebounded  strongly  and the economy expanded  at 4- 5
transferred  to Arsenal regardless  percent.
of type and size of loans.
*  Transfer Price: Book value.  Unfavorable  factors:
*  Transfer  of all types of NPLs regardless of type and
size of assets  may have made it more difficult  to use
wholesale  divestiture  techniques  and also required
Arsenal  to build up expertise  in different areas.
Ghana:  *  Restructure  and  *  Amounts of Assets Transferred:  *  NPART failed to play a substantial  role in  Favorable  factors:
NPART.  recapitalize  publicly  About 13,000  accounts  were  expediting  or enabling corporate  *  While inadequate  legal framework  hampered the
*  Initiated  operations  owned govemment  transferred  to NPART.  restructuring..  restructuring  and sale of assets,  an extra-judicial
in 1990 and closed  banks.  *  Sectoral Breakdown  of Assets:  *  NPART functioned  effectively  as a  tribunal was set up to mitigate the problem. However,
in 1997,2 years  *  Restructure  Corporate loans from state and  collection agency  and restructured  its loan  NPART was slow to make use of the tribunal which
later than stipulated.  companies  and  private sector companies  across  portfolio  via extension  of maturities  or  tumed out to often side with the debtor.
*  Wholly owned  expedite corporate  industrial and service  sectors;  modifications  to terms and conditions.  *  NPART received substantial  foreign aid in the form of
govemment agency.  restructuring.  most loans were collateralized  by  *  While govemment  owned banks were  money  and technical  support. A team of expatriate
*  Set up as  *  Maximize  recovery  plant, equipment  and machinery.  cleaned up through transfer of assets, and  experts, among which two former US RTC officials,
centralized stand-  value to reduce  *  Criteria for Asset Transfer:  Non-  banks were operationally  restructured,  managed  the operations of NPART.
alone agency.  fiscal burden on the  performing  assets otherwise  state-owned  commercial  banks in Ghana
Government.  process of asset transfer non-  appeared  to be in financial  difficulties  Unfavorable  factors:
transparent.  again in the late 1990s. At end 1997,  *  Large  amount of banking  system loans transferred
*  Transfer Price:  Book value of  govemment  state-owned  commercial  banks  (assets transferred  amounted to 51 percent of banking
assets excluding accrued  interest.  had NPLs exceeding 15 percent.  system assets) and no clear eligibility criteria  for the
*  Yet, lending  to the private sector did  type of assets to be transferred  so that NPART  ended
recover  and tumed strongly positive in  up with disparate  set of assets.
1992.
Ghana:  *  Type of asset transferred.  Over 50% of assets
NPART.  transferred  were loans to state-owned  enterprises,
assets that are typically difficult  to restructure  for a
govemment  agency that lacks independence.
18Restructuring  Objectives  of  Asset Transfer  Outcome  Key Factors
Restructuring Agency
*  Initial funding problems  slowed  down the
establishment  of NPART and the building up of
professional  expertise.
*  Senior management  consisted  of political appointees.
*  Lack of political independence  of the agency.
*  Failure  to coordinate  corporate restructuring  efforts
being  undertaken by various govemment  agencies and
NPART.
*  Weak legal framework. For example, asset sale was
impeded by the fact that debtor had to agree with sale
of assets.
Sweden:  Securum/Retriva:  *  Amounts of Assets  Transferred:  *  Securum/Retrieva  succeeded  ininanaging  Favorable  factors: Securum:  *  Established  as clean-  Securum: Gross  value: SEK 67  and selling assets in relatively  short period  *  Type of assets - mostly commercial  real estate - made *  Set up in 1992  and  up agencies/bad  billion, 4.4 percent of total  of time.  it easier  to restructure as the assets  were less politically expected to operate  banks for  banking  assets.  *  Most of Securum's and Retrieva's assets  sensitive (layoffs);  high concentration  of the economy between 10 and 15  Nordbanken  Retriva: Gross  value SEK  45  were real estate assets. Shareholdings  were  may have made industrial restructuring  easier. Also, years. Closed  (Securum)  and  billion or 3.0.percent  of banking  mostly  concentrated  in construction  transferred  assets  that were of particular  type, size, and operations  Gotha Bank  assets.  companies.  Thus, while Securum may  have  structure limited  the amount  of assets Securum had to successfully in  (Retrieva),  two  *  Sectoral Breakdown  of Assets:  helped to expedite restructuring  in the real  deal with and made it a more manageable  exercise. 1997.  banks  that  80 percent of assets  were related  estate and construction  industry by  *  Private management  and strong govemance *  Public ownership.  govemment had  to the real estate market.  enhancing  the coordination  among debtors,  mechanisms  which ensured  the agency's *  Set up as a stand-  taken over.  Securum: Loans 91.1 percent;  its impact  on the restructuring  efforts in  independence.
alone agency.  *  Recover maximum  share portfolio  6.2 percent;  real  other sectors  of the economy appears  *  Prompt structured appraisal  of assets and transparent Retriva:  values of NPLs  estate: 2.7 percent.  limited.  process of asset management,  restructuring  and sale. *  Set up in 1993, was  transferred  to it,  .Retriva: Loans 86,2  percent; real  *  In terms of restructuring  of Nordbanken  *  Adequate  legal framework. absorbed by  establish "best  share portfolio 1.6  percent;  real  and Gotha Bank, management  was  *  Adequate funding. Securum in 1995.  practice" in  estate 12.3  percent.  changed,  they were operationally  *  Adequate  skilled resources. Public ownership.  corporate  CmG-elia  for  Assei Transfer:  resiructured  and were successfuiiy  soid to  *  Limited amount of assets being  transferred  (7.7 *  Set up as a stand-  restructuring  for  Mainly size and complexity of  private investors.  percent of banking sector assets). alone agency.  private banks.  loan:  only loans over  SEK  15  *  Real lending to private sector by banks did  *  Recovery  of real estate market.
million  were  transferred,  and  not recover. In 1993/94 real  credit to the  *  Recovery  of economic  growth. In 1994,  real GDP
they  typically  consisted  of  private sector contracted  significantly.  growth  tumed positive.
corporation with  operations  in
different  countries  or  Unfavorable  factors:
complicated structures in  terms  *  Sporadic bouts of scandal due to the incentive-
of subsidiaries. Both companies  compensation  scheme for employees.
did  not  take  over  assets  that
could be securitized.
*  Transfer  Price:
Assets were transferred  at book
value.
19V.  Lessons from Cross-Country Experience
Table 4 summarizes the main characteristics of the country cases including the size
of  the banking  system  and  the depth  of  the capital  market,  the quality  of the  legal
framework as measured  in the enforcement of creditor rights and the arnount of assets
transferred to the respective AMCs. As the Table indicates, initial conditions for AMCs
were significantly weaker in the developing economies while at the same time AMCs in
these countries had  to deal with a notably larger problem as assets transferred to these
agencies accounted for a large amount of banking system assets. For example, the legal
framework was considerably weaker in developing countries and capital markets were
less  developed,  as  indicated  by  the  low bond  market  capitalization.  Governments in
Ghana and the Philippines tried to compensate for the weak legal framework by granting
superpowers to their respective AMCs (see Table 5). In both cases this  strategy proved
ineffective  as  despite  strengthened  creditor  rights  the  courts  remained  either  debtor
friendly-Ghana-or  the  overall  efficiency  of  the  court  system  did  not  improve-
Philippines.
Table 4 Characterization of Country Cases
Initial Conditions
Private  Peak level of
sector  Bond  market  NPLs
Enforcement  claims  in  capitalization  (in percent  of  Amount  of assets
of creditor  percent  of  in percent  of  financial  system  transferred  (in percent  of
rights  GDP  GDP  (Private)  assets!  financial  sstem  assets)d
Finland  18.0  87  39.7  18.7  5.2
Ghana  1.0  6  NA  60.0  50.8
Mexico  6.0  41  1.1  18.9  17.0
Philippines  7.7  79  16.6c  23.1  21.7
Spain  8.0  88  43. 2d  5.7  1.4
Sweden  24.0  145  58.5  10.8  7.4
Source: a. The product  of an index of how well the legal framework  protects secured  creditors  and a law
and order index. Creditor right index taken from Porta et al (1997) and law and order index taken from
International  Country  Risk Guide,  various  editions.  The index  ranges  from 0 to 24 with  0 as the lowest  and
24 as the highest score. d. author's calculation.  b. IMF, International  Financial  Statistics.  Private sector
claims  and bond market capitalization  are shown at the onset of the financial  crises in these countries.  c.
1983.  D. 1990.
Table 5 presents an overview of the main characteristics of the AMCs established
including its narrow objective, type of assets transferred-real  estate assets or assets or
loans to politically motivated loans-the  independence of the agency, legal superpowers
and funding resources. The table highlights that the success of the AMCs in developing
countries was mainly  hindered by the following factors. Firstly,  AMCs in developing
countries  mostly  received  non-real  estate,  state-owned  enterprise  assets,  or  assets
reflecting  political  connections.  All  of  these  types  of  assets  tend  to  be  harder  to
restructure especially  for a  government agency. Secondly, many AMCs  in developing
countries had  to  resolve large  amounts of  banking system  assets and  received assets
regardless  of  their  size. Thirdly,  AMCs  in  developing  countries  were  not  set  up  as
independent  institutions  and  thus were  susceptible  to  political  pressure.  Finally, theyoften lacked appropriate  funding to  dispose of assets quickly. None of the developing
countries outsourced the management of the assets to the private sector, including foreign
investment  banks  and  advisors  which  could  have  compensated  for  the  lack  of
independence and could have curbed the scope for political interference.
Table 5 Characteristics of AMCs established
Real estate  Outsourcing
assets  (in  Transfer  of  of
percent of  politically  Agency  has  management  Agency  has
transferred  motivated  Agency  is  legal  to private  appropriate  funding
assets)  assets  independent  superpowers  sector
Finland  34  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Ghana  Negligible  Yes  No  Yes  No  No
Mexico  NA  Yes  No  No  No  No
Philippines  Negligible  Yes  No  Yes  No  No
Spain  8.2  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
Sweden  80  No  Yes  No  No  Yes
USA  49  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes, after  initial
problems
a. Business  strategy  includes  type, size and amount  of assets  transferred.  It is judged to be appropriate  if it
is in line  with the resources  of the agency  including  its funding,  its institutional  capacity  and independence
from political  pressure  and the development  of the capital  markets.
As a result,  as Table  6 indicates,  two out of three  corporate  restructuring  AMCs  did
not  achieve  their  narrow  goals  of expediting  corporate  restructuring.  These  experiences
suggest that AMCs are rarely good tools to expedite corporate restructuring.  Only the
Swedish  AMC  successfully  managed  its portfolio,  acting  in some  instances  as lead  agent
in  the  restructuring  process.  It  was  helped  by  some  special  circumstances:  the  assets
acquired  were  mostly  real  estate  related, not  manufacturing  assets that  are harder to
restructure, and were a small fraction of the banking system, which made it easier for the
AMC to maintain its independence from political pressures and to sell assets back to the
private  sector. Rapid asset disposition vehicles fared somewhat better with two out of
four  agencies,  namely  Spain  and  the US,  achieving their  objectives.  The  successful
experiences suggest that AMCs can be  effectively used, but only for narrowly defined
purposes of resolving insolvent and unviable  financial institutions and selling off their
assets. But even achieving these objectives required many ingredients: a type of asset that
is  easily  liquifiable-real  estate-,  mostly  professional  management,  political
independence,  a  skilled  resource  base,  appropriate funding,  adequate bankruptcy  and
foreclosure  laws,  good  information  and  management  systems,  and  transparency  in
operations and processes. In the Philippines and Mexico, the success of the AMCs was
doomed from the start as governments transferred large amount of loans that had initially
been extended by the originating banks based on political connections and/or fraudulent
assets to the AMCs which are difficult to be resolved or to be sold off by a government
agency. Both of these agencies did not succeed in achieving their narrow objectives.
21Table 6 Evaluating  the Country  Cases
Type/Objective
of AMC  Corporate restructuring/
established  asset disposition  Health of banking system
Have AMCs
Share of assets  Have AMCs  achieved their
disposed  achieved their  Recurrent  Growth of  broader
narrow objective  problems  real credit  obiectives
Finland  Restructuring  >64  Unclear
No  Negative  Unclear
Ghana  Restructuring  Not applicable  No  Yes  Positive  Unclear
Mexico  Rapid Asset  0.1  No  Yes  Negative  No
Disposition
Philippines  Rapid Asset  <50  No  Yes  Positive  Unclear
Disposition
Spain  Liquidation  Majority  Yes  No  Positive  Yes
Sweden  Restructuring  86  Yes  No  Negative  Unclear
USA  Liquidation  98  Yes  No  Negative  Unclear
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Annex Table 1: Main Characterization of Banking Sector Crisis and Type of AMC Employed
Country  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis/Resolution Mechanism adopted by the  Magnitude of financial sector  Type and structure  of AMC set up
Example  government  crisis
Mexico  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking System:  - Type of AMC:
. Financial system NPLs rose  *  Rapid asset disposition agency.
(94 -95)  *  Liberalization of the financial system in 1989-90 which was not accompanied with  from 3.6% by September  1991
an adequate strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory framework  to 9.5% by September 1994  Centralized Approach:
*  Liberalization resulted in rapid asset/loan growth including consumer credit.  Rapid  and 11.3% by September  1995,  *  WA,  part of FOBAPROA, a Restructuring
credit growth strained credit assessment of bank accounts.  and 18.9% at peak.  Agency.
*  Privatization of banks in 1991/92 without ensuring that new owners were "fit and  Insolvent Banks:  Areas of Activities:
privatization  of  determining  199192alityhou  ensuring  capthat  newownerswere"fit  *  9 out of 34 commercial banks  *  Only asset sale. proper  or determining the quality of equity capital.  -accounting for 18.9% of total
*  Political instability led to widened current account deficit and reduced demand by  financial system assets.  *  Management and administration of loan portfolio
foreign investors for Mexican securities.  until sale was left with banks (an attempt was
Financially weak banks:  made to incentive banks to manage assets as 25%
Resolution Mechanism adopted  *  12 (excluding the insolvent  of losses on loan sales was imposed on banks)
banks) participated in
*  Authorities intervened in 9 banks (of 34 commercial banks).  FOBAPROA's restructuring  *  Loan repurchase program was aimed at
. The authorities implemented two programs: (i) a temporary recapitalization  scheme, 1 bank in another  restructuring of existing banks and cleaning up of
program (PROCAPTE); and (ii) A loan repurchase/recapitalization program under  recapitalization program.  intervened and closed banks to sell them off to
FOBAPROA's auspices. FOBAPROA purchased loans from banks in exchange for  *  Financially weak and insolvent  new investors.
10-year nontransferable zero-coupon Government bonds. Eleven banks participated  banks together accounted for
in the program.  98% of financial system assets.
Philippines  Causes of Financial-Sector Crisis  Banking System:  Type of AMC:
*  At their peak level, system-  *  Rapid asset disposition agency.
(81 - 86)  *  Increases in oil prices and international interest rates, coupled with deterioration in  wide NPLs stood at 23.1
terms of trade and a widening current account deficit resulted in  a balance of  percent.  Approach:
payment crisis in October 1983.  *  Centralized approach. APT, Stand-alone agency.
Insolvent Banks:
*  Improper sequencing of financial sector reform in period of macroeconomic and  *  Three commercial banks,  128  Areas of Activity
political shocks led to widespread loose lending practices.  Financial liberalization  rural banks and 32 thrift  *  APT's mandate included the disposition of non-
measures were not accompanied by a tightening of the regulatory and supervisory  institutions failed; 2 other  performing  assets transferred from three GFIs;
private banks were intervened.  *  APT was a rapid sale agency.  Any restructuring
*  Concentration of lending to related parties and fraud and mismanagement.  *  The hardest hit were the largest  of the asset was limited to physical enhancement
Resolution  Mechanism  adopted  ~~~~~~~~~~~commercial  bank, the  of the assets such as repairs.  But even such
Resolution Mechanism adopted  Philippine National Bank  enhancement operations were done on only a
*  Central Bank provided liquidity loans to ailing banks under oversight of central  (PNB) and the Development  minority of the assets that were sold.  In fact,
bank conservator.  Bank of the Philippines (DBP),  most assets were sold on "as is, where is" basis.
both state-owned, which  . In 199  1, its mandate was extended to include the
*  Unviable and insolvent institutions were liquidated and depositors paid off.  became de facto insolvent in  ity ministtion  ofgovemment-owned
. Authorities arranged for government financial institutions to take over 6 private  for ney  tof  anc  or controlled operations pursued under the
comimercial  banks;  for nearly 50%  of financial  Government's  privatization program.
system assets.
*  PNB and DBP transferred non-performing assets amounting to 21.7 percent of total
banking system assets to a government recovery agency (APT); government then
recapitalized banks and assumed deposit liabilities equal to the book value of NPLs
minus capital infusion; operational restructuring followed including reorganization
of staff and management, setting up of new credit appraisal procedures etc.Rapid Asset Disposition Agencies
Annex Table 1: Main Characterization of Banking Sector Crisis and Type of AMC Employed
Spain  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking System  Type of AMC:
*  Financial system NPLs non-  . Rapid asset disposition agency.
(77 - 85)  *  Accumulated losses during the 1  970s and early 1  980s, exacerbated by rising oil  performing loans to total loans
prices, double digit inflation and rigidities in the labor market and productive  reached their highest levels at  Approach:
sector.  These factors undermined the profitability and solvency of enterprises.  5.7 percent in 1985.  *  Centralized approach..  Not stand alone entity but
part of Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund which
*  Rapid liberalization of the banking sector following 1971 and 1974 reforms  Insolvent Financial Institutions:  acted as "bank hospitar'  serving as a vehicle for
facilitated the establishment of new banks and new branches but adequate  *  Crisis affected 52 of 110  rehabilitation  of banks and liquidations.
regulation and supervision fell behind.  Many new banks lacked professional  Spanish banks which together
experience and ethical standards expected of sound bankers.  accounted for more than 20%  Areas of Activities:
. Bank expansion was accompanied by the formation of large industrial bank groups  of total deposits and 21 % of  On a trial and erFor basis, rather than a systematic
that  gave  rise  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  total net worth.  approach, the Fund used any one or combination
that gave rise to problems such as purchase with small down payment and  of instruments to restructure the bank and
extensive debt, use of relatively inexpensive deposit base for speculative  facilitate its sale within a maximum of one year.
investment in banks oflen with inflated purchase prices, cross-ownerships with  These included: (i) partial or complete write-off
other banks and evasion of lending limits to single borrowers.  of capital and subsequent injection of capital; (ii)
*  Sharp decline-of the stock market during 1974-80 led banks and their related or  interest-free or "special" loans; (iii) acquisitions
controlling groups to tum to real estate investment.  But as property prices fell, the  of assets (nonperforming, real estate, moveable
banks were forced to renew loans and capitalize interest arrears to their borrowers.  assets, enterprises).
*  Assets that could not be sold to new investors of
Resolution Mechanism Adopted  banks or of banks that underwent liquidations
were sold off.
*  3 small institutions were liquidated.
*  26 banks were taken over by the Spanish Deposit Insurance Fund, recapitalized and
resold.
*  20 RUMASA banking institutions were nationalized and later privatized.Rapid Asset Disposition Agencies
Annex Table 1: Main Characterization of Banking Sector Crisis and Type of AMC Employed
United States  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking System:  Type of AMC:
*  Level of NPLs during height of  *  Rapid Asset Disposition Agency.
(84 - 91)  *  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, high interest rates and an inverse interest  S&L crisis: 3 percent.
rate structure led to massiVe losses for thrifts that funded their long-term assets  Approach:
with short-term deposits.  Insolvent Financial Institutions:  . Centralized.  RTC was created in 1989 as a
*  1,295 out of 3,263  thrifts were  temporary agency to resolve all failed thrift
*  The regulatory agency engaged in forbearance (weakening of capital standards etc)  insolvent which accounted for  institutions.
and deregulated the S&L sector allowing thrifts to go into (on a limited basis)  13% of thrift and bank assets
commercial real estate, unsecured consumer lending).  Moreover, the insurance  (USD 621 billion)  Areas of Activities:
coverage was increased from US $ 40,000 to US $ 100,000.  *  Liquidation  agency for S&Ls declared insolvent
by the Of  fice of Thrift Supervision or former
*  Against the background of expanded opportunities and an incentive structure that  FSLIC.
favored risk taking, S&Ls expanded their activities rapidly.  The decline in oil
prices in the first half of the 1990s and the bursting of the real estate bubble in the  *  Purchase and assumption transactions where
later half of the 1980s adversely affected the solvency of a large number of S&Ls.  healthy institutions bid to assume deposit
liabilities in exchange for receiving a
*  Structural problems of S&Ls: reliance on short-term deposits to finance long-term  combination of assets and cash.
fixed rate home mortgages in a period of rising interest rates caused depositors to
look for more attractive investments, as deposit rates were controlled. Deposits  *  Accelerated resolution program through which
were replaced by expensive borrowing, and S&Ls could not offer variable  S&Ls that were believed to have good franchise
mortgage rates.  Consequently, asset earnings deteriorated, due to rising costs of  value were sold.
funding.  *  Deposit payoff and insured deposit transfer.
*  Lending authorities(?) of S&Ls greatly expanded by adding commercial lending.
As a result, thrifts invested heavily in commercial real estate.  When the real estate  *  Asset sale.
crisis hit, towards the mid 1980s, nearly one third of the real estate industry was on
the verge of collapsing.
Resolution Mechanism Adopted
*  At first, regulatory authorities engaged in forbearance hoping that problems were
temporary and could be resolved via recapitalization on a flow basis.
*  Moreover, the early resolution programs were limited in scope and largely
unsuccessful (for example Management Consignment Program;  the Southwest
Plan, instituted for S&Ls in the Southern regions during which 329 insolvent thrifts
were disposed off; establishment of an asset disposition program FAVA in 1985
which was dismantled in  1989.
*  In late 1980s, authorities moved much more aggressively against weak and
insolvent institutions.  In 1989, Resolution Trust Corporation was set up
specifically to resolve  all insolvent thrifts.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency:
Annex Table 2: Main Characteristics of AMC
Country  Ownership & Legal  Governance Structure & Disclosure Requirements  Objectives of AMCs
Example  Structure of AMC
Mexico  Ownership:  Govemance Structure:  Objectives:
*  Public ownership:  *  Policy decisions are made by a Technical Committee whose members are the Minister of  . FOBAPROA's original goal was to sell or recover
(94 - 95)  Central Bank.  Finance, the central bank govemor, and the CNBV ( supervision body) president.  assets as quickly as possible, through auctions,
Legal Structure:  Disclosure Requirements:  securitization, or other market mechanisms.
*  Trust within the Central  *  Financial statements are not publicly available and the govemment does not disclose  *  Purchase of non-performing assets from banks was
Bank  publicly the amount of capital or other resources available to AMC.  used as a restructuring mechanism for intervened
Independence of AMC:  banks as well as for banks remaining in operation.
*  Controlled by Central Bank and Govemment and susceptible to political pressure and
interference.
Philippines  Ownership:  Govemance  Structure:  Objectives:
. Public ownership:  *  APT was supervised by an inter-ministerial body called Committee on Privatization  *  To seek an orderly and fast transfer of non-
(81 -86)  National Govemment.  (COP) with far flung responsibilities including (i) monitoring the status of the overall  performing assets to the private sector and
Legal Structure:  divestment program and the process of the asset disposition, (ii) granting approval for  the  administer them pending disposal.
terms for individual sales, and (iii) deciding on  the amounts retained by APT from the
*  Asset Privatization  proceeds of asset sales.
Trust (APT) self-
standing govemment  *  APT's financing was approved through the govemment's  budgetary process & hiring of
institution that served as  staff was management's responsibility.
the govemment's  trustee
for the disposition of  *  COP comprised the Minister of Finance, Director General of NEDA, Minister of Budget,
assets.  Minister of Trade and Industry and Minister for Govemment Reorganization.
*  COP was created initially for a period of 5 years and has remained a supervisory body for
APT.
Disclosure Requirements:
*  Not subject to any public disclosure requirements.
*  Is required to submit annual reports to the President of the Philippines, the Ministry of
Finance and to Congress on the status of its asset disposition program including
description of the individual assets sold, the purchasers, and agreed payment terms.
Independence of AMC:
*  APT was subject to political interference as COP had wide ranging involvement in
operations and had to approve each single asset sale. Furthermore, despite APT's
procedures, it succumbed to Congressional  criticisms on the sale price of the assets which
resulted in a slowdown of the disposition process.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency:
Amnex  Table 2: Main Characteristics of AMC
Country  Ownership  & Legal Structure  of  Governance  Structure  & Disclosure Requirements  Objectives  of AMCs
Example  AMC
Spain  Ownership:  Govemance Structure:  Objectives:
*  Public ownership  *  Governed by an eight member Board of Directors. Four members are bankers  *  Restructure banks for prompt resale by carving out
(77 - 85)  of acknowledged standing (appointed by the Ministry of Finance upon  bad assets that new investors were unwilling to
Legal Structure:  proposal by the central bank), who serve in their individual capacity and not as  take on.
*  Govemment Guarantee Fund was  representatives of their banks.  The remaining four are Directors of the central
given the legal capacity in 1980 to  bank.  The Board is chaired by a representative of the central bank.  *  Prompt sale of carved out assets with the aim to
assume bank ownership to initiate  maximize recovery value
bank restructuring in addition to its  Disclosure Requirements:
original mandate of ensuring  *  Annual audited financial statements were disclosed to the public.
depositor protection.
United States  Ownership:  Governance Structure:  Objectives: RTCs stated objectives were both
(84 - 91  )  *  Public ownership  *  Initial structure: RTC management lay with FDIC. A high-level Oversight  commercial and social namely:
(egal4-91)cture:  Board monitored RTC'a activities and was accountable for RTC's  policy,
Legal Structure:  strategic planning and budget and was barred from specific case involvement.  *  Maximize net value of proceeds from S&L
*  RTC was established as temporary  It consisted of the following five members: 1) Secretary of the Treasury  resolution.
federal agency  (chairman); 2) Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; 3) Secretary of  *  Minimize impact on local real estate and financial
Housing and Urban Development;  4) Two executives from the private sector.  market.
*  Modified structure at the urging of FDIC: the 1' structure resulted in confusion  *  Make efficient use of received funds.
with regard to public accountability and contributed to friction between the
FDIC and RTC management.  In 1992, RTC became an independent  *  Minimize resolution costs.
organization headed by a chief executive that was responsible for many of the
activities assigned to oversight board and FDIC.  The Oversight Board was  *  Social Mandate:  maximize available and
replaced by the new Thrift Depositor Oversight Board which representation  affordable housing for low-to-moderate income
from both RTC and FDIC and was primarily responsible for approving  individuals.
requests for govemment funds, reviewing policies and strategies.  FDIC was
relived of its management responsibilities.
Disclosure Requirements:
*  Mandatory and extensive rennrting tn the Oversight Rnard
*  Publication of annual audited financial statements (GAO audit)
*  Information readily available to the public (RTC had a public information
room, press releases on every resolution/closing and other RTC initiatives).Rapid Asset Disposition Agency:
Annex Table 3: Legal Environment and Management of AMC
Country  Sunset Clause and if yes,  Broader Legal Environment in which AMC  Management of AMC and Quality and  Funding of AMC
Example  was it honored  operated  Remuneration of Staff
Mexico  *  No sunset clause.  Adequacy of bankruptcy and foreclosure law:  *  FOBAPROA: Managed by the central bank.  *  Annual and special contributions
*  Lack of functioning bankruptcy system.  from commercial banks and from
(94 - 95)  *  FOBAPROA relied entirely on the staff of the  lending extended to it by the central
*  Owing to political pressure, existing  central bank and thus was affected by the lack  bank;  plus,  borrowings from the
foreclosure regulation was not allowed to be  of expertise in administering asset resolution.  central bank.  May also borrow
enforced from Dec 1994 to 1997, making it  from the Government through the
impossible for FOBAPROA's capacity to  MoF.
foreclose on NPLs.
*  Funding was insufficient and the
Did AMC have any superpowers? If so, what type:  lack of adequate funding severely
*  No.  hampered asset sales.
Philippines  *  5 years (1987-91).  Adequacy of bankruptcy and foreclosure law:  *  APT's Board of Trustees was appointed by the  *  Initial capital of P 90 million pesos
*  In the Philippines, foreclosure lenders that  President of the Philippines (Chief Executive  was equity through an
(81 - 86)  *  To date, APT is still in  want to foreclose on assets need to go through  Trustee and 4 Associate Executive Trustees).  appropriation from the national
operation.  In addition to  the judicial process.  budget; amounts authorized to be
the non-performing loans,  *  The qualifications of the trustees hired in 1987  taken from the proceeds of
APT was charged with the  *  Some loans from DBP and PNB were  were as follows: the Chief Trustee was a  disposition agreed by COP; annual
divestiture of very large  transferred with already existing legal  respected banker and three associate trustees  appropriations from the budget;
govemment corporations  disputes, including those on collateral  were private businessmen.  It is not cleaT  if it  external assistance; service fees
in 1991 (with the intention  foreclosure, that APT had to contend with.  continued that way.  levied on trusted assets as approved
of being the Fund Manager  b  P
foir  the proposed Philippine  *  When APT lost its immunity from lawsuits  *  APT was empowered to hire its own staff,  y COP.
Privatization Fund); and  strictly vis-a-vis the sale of assets, it further  although it was envisaged that it would rely as
thus Congress amended  hampered disposition.  The immunity meant  much as possible on secondments from other
APT's life to another five  that APT could not be sued for the sale of the  govemment entities.
years, i.e., up to  1996.  assets or could not be made subject to
restraining orders to halt proposed sales.  Moreover, APT could draw on exteral
*  In 1996, APT's lifetime  expertise and outsourcing  in areas where it
was again extended until  Did AMC have any superpowers? If so, what type:  would prove costly to build up internal
end-I1999.  *  Under its original statute, APT was provided  expertise
with immunity from lawsuits vis-a-vis the sale  *  Management of the assets pending asset sale
of assets. APT lost those powers in 1991  was out-sourced to DBP and  PNB, banks
when the original statute under which it was  which held NPLs prior to the transfer under a
created expired.  management contract with APT.
*  As 40-50% of the assets transferred remain in  *  Initially, APT staff were exempt from the
APT's portfolio to this date, APT essentially  standardization rule on Government salaries.
lost the opportunity to divest the assets quickly  Thus APT was able to attract skilled staff.
while the immunity was still in force.  However, when its lifetime was extended, this
exemption was removed.  According to APT's
current management, it has had no problems in
attracting  skilled staff.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency:
Annex Table 3: Legal Environment and Management of AMC
Country  Sunset Clause and if yes,  Broader  Legal Environment  in which AMC  Management  of AMC and Quality  and  Funding  of AMC
Example  was it honored  operated  Remuneration  of Staff
Spain (77-85)  *  No sunset clause.  Adequacy of bankruptcy and foreclosure law:  *  Fund was professionally managed.  *  Equal contributions by the central
Guarantee Fund is still in  *  The then prevailing laws governing  bank and the Spanish banking
operations.  bankruptcy or liquidation dated from the I 919  *  Executive director of the Fund (called its  system.
century and were therefore, archaic, complex,  Secretary General) managed a staff (120
and inefficient.  persons at its peak down to 40 in the late  . Because the Fund was established
1980s) and consisted of commercial bankers,  in the midst of the crisis and the
*  In particular, the recovery of creditors' claims  lawyers, and technical experts.  financial resources from the above
was a very costly process.  proved insufficient, the central
*  Salanies  paid were slightly above those in  bank was empowered by law to
*  Moreover, the lack of relevant professional  commercial banks.  make long-term loans at the
skills of the judicial system's employees  rediscount rate to the Fund, with no
hampered efficient debt restructuring (whose  limit.
inclination was to simply reduce the size of
debts).
Did AMC have any superpowers? If so, what type:
*  The expansion of powers under the royal
decree of 1990 gave the Fund legal status for
bank restructuring that included asset
resolution as one of the instruments.
*  With respect to bankruptcy and foreclosure,
the Fund was/is not equipped with any extra-
legal powers.
United States  . RTC was to cease  Adequacy of bankruptcy and foreclosure law:  *  Professional management: Majority of RTC  *  Two categories of funding:
existence at end Dec. 1996  *  Existence of adequate and enforceable  senior personnel came from the FDIC who
(84 -91)  bankruptcy and foreclosure laws facilitated the  were familiar and experienced with resolution  -Government funding "loss funds"
*  Sunset clause honored  resolution process.  of insolvent  institutions  (unrecoverable expenditures)
(RTC created in 1989 and  -okn  aia  epne  ob
closed at end-95)  Did AMC have any superpowers? If so, what type:  *  RTC made extensive use of private sector  -Workig  capital (expenses to be
=~~~~~~~-  PxT  ha  -1-A-owor  wihncue:coeaor  or  ascdipifoan  -l.d  repaid eventually from interest on
ta  ... k ~  "  r  asset collection
-right to void burdensome contracts;  s  Ls
-authority to override certain state laws (e.g.  . RTC pay le)vels  weebsed  on  goernment  billion in loss funds (initially USD
branching rights);  pay scales, but were somewhat higher (+I10%)  50 billion) but did not provide for
because they included locality and other  working  butal
-right to disavow claims by S&Ls borrowers.  differentials. No special incentives other than  working capital
possibilities for awards based on special  *  Lack of working capital and delays
*  RTC had power to resolve thrifts through  achievements  in government funding hampered
conservatorship or receivership  speedy resolution. It forced
institutions to stay in
conservatorship for extended
periods.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency
Annex Table 4: The Asset Transfer Process
Country  Example  Criteria  for asset  transfer  Process  of Asset  Transfer  Amount  and Sectoral  Breakdown  of Assets  transferred  to
and transfer  price  AMC
Mexico  *  Criteria for asset transfer:  *  FOBAPROA would purchase loans from banks in an amount  Amount of total assets transferred as percentage of total banking system
(94 - 95)  Process of asset transfer was  equal to roughly two times the amount of new equity  assets/banking system loans, and as percentage of GDP
nontransparent;  there were no  (including mandatory convertible subordinated debt) that  *  P142 billion (P1 19 billion net of reserves  for loan losses) were
clear policies nor guidelines  shareholders were willing to commit to bank.  transferred.  This amounted to 22.8% of the banking system's  total
developed for type of loans  loans; or 17% of total banking system assets, and 11% of GDP
that were eligible for  *  Loans were transferred at book value.
transferal.  Sectoral breakdown of assets transferred
*  FOBAPROA did not value nor write down loans  *  Assets transferred included consumer, mortgage and corporate
*  This led to perceptions that  immediately after transfer because of a lack of funding and  loans (Breakdown NA).
some banks were receiving  out of hesitation to reveal the true losses.
more favorable treatment than  Were any loans left in banks and if so, amount and type:
others.  *  Yes
*  Transfer price: book value.
Philippines  *  Criteria for asset transfer:  *  When assets were transferred, DBP and PNB had already  Amount of total assets transferred as percentage of total banking system
Transferred assets were those  foreclosed on those loans. APT attempted to take title and  assets/banking system loans, and as percentage of GDP
(81 - 86)  accounts whose individual  possession of assets; if necessary it could file suits for the  *  Assets of about P 108 billion (US$ 5 billion equivalent) with
book values amounted to  recovery and protection of such assets.  estimated  recovery value of about US I billion were transferred to
more than P10 million.  APT which amounted to 21.7% of total banking system assets or
*  Assets transferred are valued by third party appraisers every  17.7% of GDP.
*  Transfer Price: Assets were  three months.  *  As a consequence, the two public banks shrank dramatically. In
transferred at book value.  case of DBP, total assets were reduced from P 74 billion to P 10
billion and for PNB, from P 70 billion to P 26 billion.
Sectoral breakdown of assets transferred:
*  Distribution of the 389 accounts: agriculture 37; government 44;
manufacturing 159; mining 27; service, trading, utilities and others
116.
*  70% of asset value was concentrated in 59 assets (or 15% of the
accounts).
Were any loans left in banks and if so, amount and type:
*  Yes, non-performing accounts each with a value of not more than
P 10 million.
*  Estimated that these amounted to P 27 billion or 20% of the
combined  assets  of the two banks,  or 9-10%  of the banking  system
assets.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency
Annex Table 4: The Asset Transfer Process
Spain  . Criteria for Transfer of  . Upon assuming control of the bank, the Fund removed the  Amount of total assets transferred as percentage of total banking system
(77 -85)  Ownership to Guarantee  existing senior management and appointed a new  assets/banking system loans, and as percentage of GDP:
Fund:  The transfer of control  management team, performed due diligence, undertook  *  Of the 28 banks resolved through the Fund, most were absorbed
of entire banks to the Fund  restructuring measures such as securing and collection of  by domestic and foreign banks. These banks accounted for x
occurred at a shareholders  loans, liquidation of fixed assets, reduction in financial costs  percent of total banking system assets.  Prior to their sale, assets
assembly convened no later  and cuts in staff and general overhead and design of a  amounting to 373 billion pesetas were carved out and transferred
than 7 days after the central  financial assistance package.  to the Deposit Guarantee Fund.
bank's request.  Beforehand,
the Central Bank informed  *  Mostly the large domestic banks purchased or took over the  Sectoral breakdown of assets transferred:
shareholders of the extent of  banks; the foreign banks that participated in the resale  *  Assets:  Ptas 270 billion, equivalent to 72.4% of total 373 billion.
losses and the impact of  included: Barclays, BNP, BCCI Holdings, Citibank (in
write-offs on the capital and  consortium), Chase Manhattan.  Legally, they had to offer  *  Real estate:  Ptas 30.7 billion, or 8.2% of total.
reserves of the problem bank.  bank for sale within a year.  *  Shareholdings: 72.2 billion, or 19.4% of total.
*  Fund coordinated its operations closely with the central  Were any loans left in banks and if so, amount and typ
bank, especially in the early and final stages of intervention.  W  Yes. Performing assets were left in banks which were being sold.
Both worked closely together in designing the financial
packages that were the basis of negotiations for the resale of
the bank.
United States  *  Criteria for asset transfer:  . Resolution Process:  institutions were placed under RTC  Amount of total assets transferred as percentage of total banking system
(84  -91)  NA.  conservatorship with the objective to prepare them for sale  assets/banking system loans, and as percentage of GDP:
(84 - 91)  while preserving any franchise or business value.  This  *  Assets taken over by the RTC: USD 455 billion, accounting for
*  Transfer Price: NA.  process required establishing control, stopping speculative or  about 8.5% of total bank and thrift assets (approximately 8% of
abusive practices, identifying and evaluating assets and  GDP).
liabilities, minimizing operating losses, and beginning an
orderly downsizing.  . Assets sold via asset disposition (not as part of the institution or
through collection): USD 153 billion, equivalent to 2.7% of GDP.
*  Then institutions were either sold in P&As, or through the
accelerated resolution program, or resolved by deposit  Sectoral breakdown of assets transferred:
payoff or insured deposit transfer or liquidation.  *  1-4 unit family mortgages:25%
. Assets that could not be sold through P&As and other  *  Other mortgages: 17%
methods were sotd ott via secuntization ot homogenous  *  Real estate:7%
assets
*  Other loans:8%
*  Cash and securities: 35%
*  Other assets: 8%
Were any loans left in banks and if so, amount and type: Not applicable.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency
Annex Table 5: Process of Asset Dispositions
Country  Process of Asset Sale/disposition: timeframe, procedure (including type of auctions,  Results of asset sale-Recovery  per $ of assets  Assets sold and assets
Example  when applicable) and type of assets sold  sold  that remain on books of
AMC (as % of total)
Mexico  Was  transfer  of assets  a one-off  process?  Result  of Asset  Sale:  *  Up to end of 1998,  only
(94-95)  *  Three  rounds of assets  sales;  one occurred  in 1995,  and two rounds  occurred  in 1996.  *  P150  million  face  amount.  0.05 of assets  were sold.
Procedure  for sale of assets:  *  Winners  bid only  49% of face  value,  exposing  the
*  One  small trial auction  was  conducted  which  involved  real estate  backed  assets  amounting  to  authorities  to criticism  from  the opposition  and
0.11%  of total loans  purchased  from banks  in 1997.  from  certain  quarters  within  the government.
Purchaser  of Assets:  The  winning  bidder  for the one
auction  that took  place  in August 1997  was a joint
venture  that involved  Goldman  Sachs.
Philippines  Was  transfer  of assets  a one-off  process?  Result  of Asset  Sale:  *  40-50%  of assets  still
*  Yes.  *  APT reached  its 1987-91  sales target  of US$ I  remain  in APT's
(81  - 86)  billion (out of the transfer  value of $5 billion)  in  portfolio.
Procedure  for sale of assets  sales  atler privatizing  all or part of 245 of the
*  Assets  were sold through  public  bidding but also negotiated  sales in exceptional  cases.  total  accounts.
*  In instances  where  public  auctions  "failed"  to result  in a sale  twice,  APT  could  undertake  a  *  50-60  % of original  assets  transferred  were sold
negotiated  sale. The  Commission  on Audit  had to approve  the lahter  type of transactions.  over 11  years,  i.e., since APT's creation  in 1987.
*  APT  obtained  three  appraisal  values  from third  party appraisers.  Then an announcement  would  be  Purchaser  of Assets: Not applicable.
published  to invite  bidding  on the  assets  with information  on the asset,  the  company,  the bidding
process,  the appraised  value.  Operating  principles  gave  preference  to domestic
buyers  and excluded  former  owners.  In reality,
Timeframe:  some  former  owners  succeeded  to reduce  their
*  The average  time  it took  to sell assets  through  public  bidding was  one month  from  the date when  assets  and DBP bought  back some  loans.
the invitation  for bidding  is published.
*  Two  forms  of pricing:  (i) an indicative  or base  price - the appraised  value;  and (ii)  open pricing.
*  The auction  method  was the prefenred  procedure  and APT's  public announcement  provided
information  of the asset's  appraised  value. If two auctions  did not result  in a sale,  APT  resorted  to
open pricing. If the latter  still failed to yield  a sale,  then the asset could  be offered  for a negotiated
sale.
*  In case of open pricing,  if the fai market  value is deemed  to exceed  the highest  bid received,
alternative  procedures  could  be followed  to try to get as close to the market  value through  a
negotiated  sale.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency
Annex Table 5: Process of Asset Dispositions
Country  Process of Asset Sale/disposition: timeframe, procedure (including type of auctions,  Results of asset sale-Recovery  per $ of assets  Assets sold and assets
Example  when applicable) and type of assets sold  sold  that remain on books of
AMC (as % of total)
Spain  Was  transfer  of assets  a one-off  process?  Result  of Asset  Sale:  *  The Fund  has been able
*  Generally,  bank take-over  was a one-off  process. However,  the Fund intervened  twice in the  *  Sale of Banks. Of the 29 banks  resolved  through  to sell almost
(77 - 85)  Banco  Industrial  del Mediterraneo,  in 1980  and 1982.  the Fund and most  were absorbed  by domestic  everything.  But, they
and foreign  banks.  have still  have a
Process  of asset sale:  minimal  amount  of
*  Assets  were sold  through  (i) divestiture  of stock  holdings  of the Fund in firms  or holding  *  Mostly  large domestic  banks  purchased  or took  assets.
companies  or liquidations;  (ii)  sale of real estate  acquired;  (iii) sale  of portfolio  of security  over the banks;  the foreign  banks that participated
holdings;  (iv)  sale of loans  (no information  on selling  methods).  in the  resale  included:  Barclays,  BNP,  BCCI
Spain.Accumulated  losses/profits:  Holdings,  Citibank  (in consortium),  Chase
Spain  Accumulated  losses/profits:  Manhattan.
(77-85)  *  Purchase  of assets  continued  through  1985  and the sale  of most assets  have  been  completed.
According  to the Deposit  Guarantee  Fund's 1986  annual  report (taken  as year crisis  subsided):  *  Sale of  Assets. With  regards  to the loans that
-Losses  related  to clean-up  of banks:  Ptas 25.7  billion  could  not be sold to the new  investors  of the
-Accumulated  losses:  90 billion  pesetas.  banks,  sale of mortgage  loans and  real estate
proved  most successful. Most assets  were sold
but a few still  remain  in the Fund's portfolio.
Purchaser  of Assets: Both domestic  and foreign
United  States  Was  transfer  of assets  a one-off  process?  Not applicable.  Result  of Asset  Sale:  *  RTC assets  at book
(84- 91)  Timeframe:  assets  remained  in conservatorship  for 13  months  on average  before  liquidation  *  Recovery  rate:  value  ($455  billion
Procedure  & Type  of Assets  sold:  -86 cents  to the dollar  (losses  at disposition/total  remained  on books)  of
assets  taken over  by the RTC).  which:
*  RTC asset  disposition  tools for assets  that were  not sold to acquiring  bank thrift  (in general  about  -Assets  sold: 33%
21  % of assets  was  passed  on to acquirers,  mostly  securities  and 1-4  family mortgages):  -In general,  wholesale  asset  sales (securitization,  -Collections:3  1%
bulk sales,  equity  partnerships  and auctions)  had  -Cash  & Securities:10%
-Securitization  (accounted  for 27% of assets  sales):  primary  method  for sale  of all performing  14  higher  net recovery  rates  compared  to retail  sales  -Assets  transferred  to
family mortgages. multi family and commercial mortgages; and consumer loans.  (nrivztp. rnntr,mtnrq  hnernime  nf faster diasno.itinn  nurchaser  of thrifhs 11  N
-Bulk  portfolio  sales "structured  transactions"(14%  of asset sales):  primarily  used to dispose  off  rate and shorter  holding  periods.  -Losses:13%
non-performing  commercial  mortgages  and problem  real estate.  Method  used to achieve  high  -The  recovery  rate ranged from 98% for  -Remaining  assets
velocity  of sales since  selling  commercial  assets  one by one would  have taken  years. It took  securities,  96% for 14 family  mortgages,  to 55%  (transferred  to FDIC)
generally  up to 9 months  to package  and  close the sales  of such large  pools of assets  (almost  70 %  for real estate.  2%.
were in pools over $ 200 million  each).
-Of 747 resolved  thrifts,  497 were purchase  and
-"Equity  participation"  (11%  of asset sales):  designed  to dispose  off non-performing  loans and  assumption  (P&As),  158  were insured  deposit
certain  real estate.  The RTC,  as a limited  partner,  contributed  assets  to the limited  partnership  pay-offs,  and 92 were uninsured  deposit  payoffs.
while  the private  sector partner  (general  partner)  was responsible  for the  management  and
disposition  of assets.  The  cash flow derived  from asset disposition  was  the divided  (on a
predetermined  basis)  between  the RTC  and the general  partner.Rapid Asset Disposition Agency
Annex Table 5: Process of Asset Dispositions
Country  Process of Asset Sale/disposition:  timeframe,  procedure  (including  type of auctions,  Results  of asset sale-Recovery  per $ of assets  Assets sold and assets
Example  when applicable)  and type of assets sold  sold  that  remain on books of
AMC (as % of total)
United  States  -Auctions  (2%  of asset  sales):  used to sell a large  volume  of relatively  small  homogenous  assets  at  Purchaser  of Assets:
a single  event For these auctions,  RTC stratified  loans  to produce  homogenous  packages  - assets
(84  - 91  )  were auctioned  according  to type,  asset  size  and location.  Loan  assets  used for the auctions  were  Mostly  domestc insttutonal investors,  but there
mostly  non-performing.  were  intemational  investors  as well. In addition,
the RTC had a special  program  targeted  at
-Outsourcing  to private  companies  - referred  to as 'Yetail"  asset disposition  method  in contrast  to  smaller  investors  (limited  program).  Purchasers
"wholesale"  for the above  mentioned  programs  (21%  of asset sales):  one of the principal  methods  had to sign eligibility  certificate,  in which  they
to dispose  off more complex  and diverse  portfolios  including  commercial,  consumer  and  credit  basically  certified  that they  were ethical  and had
card loans;  commercial  and residential  real estate;  and subsidiaries  assets.  Private  contractors  were  not previously  been responsible  for causing
paid on a fee  basis, which  included  perfornance-based  fees  (depended  on speed  of asset sales  and  losses  at a failed  institutions.
amounts  recovered).
-Affordable  housing  program  (1%  of assets  sales):  in compliance  with the RTC social  mandate,
more than 100,000  units of affordable  housing  (single  and multi  fanily units)  sold to lower-incomne
families  accompanied  by seller  financing  facilities.
Other sales  (24% of asset  sales):  included  fumiture,  fixtures,  equipment,  loans  and  real estate sold
by RTC field offices.
Accumulated  losses/profits:
*  Since  inception  and through  1995,  RTC losses  anounted to USD  88 billion of which
-Realized  losses  and expenses  (89  - 95): USD  81 billion.
-Estimated  future  losses:  USD  7 billion.
Losses include operating expenses and losses  from assets  sales.  _Restructuring Agencies
Annex Table 6:  Main Characterization of Banking Sector Crisis and Type of AMC Employed
Country  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis/Resolution mechanism adopted  Magnitude of financial sector  Type and Structure of AMC set up
Example  by the government  crisis
Finland  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking System (total):  Type of AMC:
*  18.7% of loans were non-  . Restructuring agencies.
(91 - 94)  *  Liberalization of financial sector in late 1980's without appropriate  performing by end of 1993.  - Sponda: set up for Skopbanks real estate assets.
strengthening of regulatory and supervisory framework, particularly in  - Solidium: set up to deal with claims on one industry group.
savings bank sector.  Insolvent Banks:  - Arsenal: set up to manage problem loans and other loans of SBF
*  Libraliztion  ed  t  rapi  credt  groth  wich  sraine  finacial-Skopbank:  accounting for 5.1% of  and to liquidate itS real estate assets and other holdings.
t  Liberalization led to rapid credit growth which strained financial  total banking system loans;  Essentially used to wind down SBF.
institutions credit assessments and monitoring capacity particularly in
savings sector.  -SBF:  (new entity in which 41  - STS: which assumed all NPLs and 'bad' assets of STS Bank.
(solvent and insolvent) savings  Approach
*  Break-up of Soviet Union and with it collapse of Finnish export  banks were merged in  1991). SBF  Arsenal:
business.  accounted for  23.9% of total  *  Stand alone entity.
. Devaluation of markka by over 30%, which adversely affected deposit  financial system assets;  . In the end, centralized approach, as some of Skopbank's real
money banks as they were indirectly exposed to foreign exchange risk.  -STS Bank: accounting for 2% of  estate assets and STS assets are transferred to Arsenal.
Resolution mechanism adopted  financial system assets.  Areas of Activity
Arsenal:
*  In 1991, the central bank took over Skopbank.  *  Credit Administration: granting new loans and guarantees,
*  In 1992, the govemment (i) offered capital support facility for deposit  collection of receivables, corporate restructuring and legal
money banks and injected up to  12%  of the sector's regulatory  consulting
prescribed capital into the sector; and (ii) set up the Government  *  Real Estate: Management, leasing and liquidation of property
Guarantee Fund (GGF) "to safeguard the stable functioning of the  portfolio. Arsenal does not engage in construction management.
banking system".  However unfinished property development projects can be
*  GGF supported 41 savings banks (later amalgamated to form the  completed if it is probable that the overall result is better than
Savings Bank of Finland (SBF)) with capital injection and issuance of  through selling unfinished project.
guarantees.  SBF's performing loans were sold whereas its NPLs were  *  Customer support in terms of corporate evaluation, acquisitions
moved to a restructuring agency.  and corporate restructuring.
*  In 1993, the government intervened in STS Bank and issued a guarantee  *  Treasury and capital market operations, by which group refinances
on bank liabilities to bolster (foreign) investors'  confidence.  and monitors the liquidity, maturity and interest rate management
risks, and which also manages equity portfolio.
Ghana  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking System:  Type of AMC:
a  Level of non-performing loans  . Restructuring agency.
(82 - 89)  *  Financial liberalization in the mid-1980s resulted in liquidity and  amounted to C59 billion or 60% of
solvency problems in the banking sector due to:  total at end 1989.  Appoach:
- serious shortcomings in bank regulations and inadequate banking  *  Stand alone entity. Centralized approach.
supervision;  Insolvent Banks:
- deficient bank management and poor procedures and controls; and  *  7 out of 11 audited major banks  Areas of Actvity:
- massive devaluation and dismantling of protection barriers as part of  were insolvent.  *  NPART's  Operating Policies stated that: "Recovery should allow
a structural reform program leading to increased indebtedness of the  for reasonable  wotk-out arrangements with existing debtors.
corporate sector and reduced capacity to service its debt.  Where work-out arrangements were not feasible or promising,
NPART would dispose of the productive assets on a "going
*  The heritage of accumulated enterprise losses following years of high  concern" basis.  Liquidation sale would be undertaken only where
inflation, macroeconomic instability and devaluation aggravated loan  efforts with sale on a "going concem" basis failed or appeared
losses in the banking  system.  remote."Annex Table 6:  Main Characterization of Banking Sector Crisis and Type of AMC Employed
Country  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis[Resolution mechanism adopted  Magnitude of financial sector  Type and Structure of AMC set up
Example  by the government  crisis
Resolution mechanism adopted
*  A large part of NPLs owed by public and private to 7 enterprises banks
were transferred to NPART, a restructuring agency in exchange for
govemment bonds.
*  Advances to the govemrnment  and SOEs were first offset against
govemment loans and the rest was converted into equity.
Sweden  Causes of Financial Sector Crisis  Banking system:  Type of AMC:
*  Financial system NPLs at end of  *  Restructuring Agencies.
(91 - 94)  *  Liberalization of financial sector in 1980s without appropriate  1992, 10.8 %. Crisis was  - Securum: set up to manage NPLs transferred from Nordenbanken
strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory system.  considered systemic as five of the  - Retriva AB: set up to handle all non-performing assets of  Gotha
*  Led to lending boom which strained credit assessment and monitoring  six largest banks were involved,  Bank
skills in banking sector and  which amounted to over 70% of  - Mandamus: set up to manage real estate assets and shares in
banking system assets  operating companies taken over from ForeningsSparbanken
*  To protracted real estate boom (high investment in real estate also due  Insolvent Banks:  Approach:
to tax laws that favored borrowing over savings).  -Nordbanken and Gotha Bank,  *  Stand alone entities.
*  Swedish economy deflated in 1990 and real estate bubble burst, high  accounting for 21.6% of banking  . Decentralized approach.
interest rates and recession increased loan losses to banks. Crisis for  system assets.  *  Govemment set up separate AMCs for Nordbanken and Gotha
krona led to very high interest rates (up to 500%) and later to a  -Sparbanken Foresta AB,  Bank, Securum and Retriva, repectively;
substantial depreciation of the krona when it started to float. Both  accounted for 24% of banking  . Private banks who needed  Govemment assistance, they were
events undermined the capability of many borrowers to service their  assets  required to set up their own AMC. Example: Mandamus.
debt.
debt.  Financially weak banks:  Areas of Activity
Resolution mechanism adopted  - Four major banks accounting for  . Securum:
60% of banking system assets  - Restructures NPls including taking ownership position and
*  Govemment first dealt with the crisis on an ad hoc basis by merging  controling management of firms.
Sparbanken with  Swedbanken; intervening in Nordbanken and splitting  - Provide new loans to borrowers
bank into a good bank and an asset management company Securum.  - Trade securities.
*  At end 1992, the govemment issued a blanket guarantee on bank  - Liquidate nonviable companies.
liabilities and took over Gotha Bank, wrote its share capital down to  Retriva:
zero and transferred NPLs to another AMC.  Moreover, the govemment  - Restructures NPIs including taking ownership position and
introduced a voluntary bank recapitalization plan which laid out  controling management of firms.
conditions under which it would provide capital support for remaining  - Provide new loans to borrowers
banks in the system.  (None of the remaining private banks made use of  - Trade securities.
the support scheme).  - Liquidate nonviable companies.
*  In 1993, Nordbanken and Gotha Bank were merged as well as their  *  Mandamus:
respective AMCs.  - Manages real estate assets and shares in operating companies
taken over by ForeningsSpar-banken and in conjunction with this,
handle problem loans and workout loans.Restructuring Agency:
Annex Table 7: Main Characteristics of AMC
Country  Ownership & Legal Structure of  Governance Structure & Disclosure Requirements  Objectives of AMCs
Example  AMC
Finland  Ownership:  Governance  Structure:  Objectives
91 -94)  *  Public.  The  Government  of Finland  Arsenal:  Arsenal:
(91  94)  owns  79% and the Government  *  Board  of Directors  consists  of 2 members  from the  private  sector and  4 members  appointed  by the MoF,  *  To manage  and
Guarantee  Fund  owns 21.1%.  the Ministry  of Industry  and the Prime  Minister  liquidate  NPLs and
other holdings,  in an
Legal Structure:  *  Overall,  Operations  are supervised  by Government  Guarantee  Fund,  State  Audit Office  and  parliamentary  orderly  mianner  and  at a
Arsenal  State  Auditors.  minimum  cost.
*  Limited  joint stock  company
govemed  by the Finnish  Govemrnent  *  Public  Meeting  appoints  Senior  Management  and Board  of Directors
Act.  Disclosure  Requirements:
*  Changed  to limited  public  company  Arsenal:
in Feb. 1998,  due to change  in  *  Publishes  Annual  report with  audited  annual  financial  statements.
legislation  which  prescribed  *  Website  contains  interim  reports,  key  figures  on company's  capital  and shareholders
companies  listed  in Helsinki  stock
exchange  to be set up as public  *  Monthly  reports  are also  available  to the public.
companies.
Independence  of AMC:
Arsenal:
*  Arsenal  is managed  by a professional  management  team. Its activities  are  overseen  by a Board  of
Directors  which  consists  of 4 members  from Gov't  sector and 2 members  from  private  sector.  The CEO
was brought  from the private  sector.  The  organization  follows  legislation  and is fully  independent  on
daily decisions.
Ghana  Ownership:  Governance  Structure:  Objectives-
*  Wholly  owned  government  agency  *  Govemed  and supervised  by a Board  of Trustees  consisting  of representatives  from the Ministry  of  *  Restructure  and
(82 -89)  Finance,  the central  bank,  the chief  administrator  of NPART,  an accountant  and a private  lawyer  and  recapitalize  banks.
Legal  Structure:  three  other experts  (one  from the  private  sector).  The  Board  was responsible  for formulating  NPART  *  Asset  management
*  Govemment  Agency  set up in 1990,  guidelines  and supervising  its management.  activities  was aimed  at
considerably  much  iater  af'ir 'tzg marxrnnizig  rcIuuveiy
crisis  began.  Disclosure  Requirements:  value to reduce  fiscal
*  No activity  nor financial  statements  were  published.  burden  on the
*  Annual  audited  financial  reports  were  submitted  to the Board  of Trustees.  govemment
*  Annual  report on the management  of NPART  submitted  to the Provisional  National  Defense  Council.
*  Financial  reports  were also submitted  to the Ministry  of Finance  and Central  Bank and the implementing
agency  for the World  Bank's FINSACI.
Independence  of AMC:
*  Government  heavily  involved  in decision-making  process  as it dominated  the Board  of Trustees..
*  Moreover,  head of NPART  was  a political  appointee  who was selected  not on the  basis of technical
skills.Annex  'lable  7: Main  (Charactenstics  ot AMC
Country  Ownership  & Legal  Structure  of  Governance  Structure  & Disclosure  Requirements  Objectives  of AMCs
Example  AMC
Sweden  Ownership:  Govemance Structure:  Objectives:
*  SecurumlRetriva:Public ownership  Securum/Retriva:  Securum/Retriva:
(91 - 94)  *  Board of Directors appointed by Ministry of Finance.  Senior management appointed by Board of  *  Recover maximum
*  Mandamus: Private ownership  Directors.  All members were from private sector except for one member of Board of Directors who was a  values of NPLs
MoF official.  transferred to it.
*  Establish best practices
Legal Structure:  *  Operations monitored by Bank Support Authority, which represents the Swedish State.  for private banks.
. Securuni/Retriva: Limited public  *  Market Committee consisting of representatives from various business organizations monitored projects'  *  Clean up of Nordbanken
companies govemed  under corporate  sound business practices to ensure credibility  and Gota Bank.
law.
*  Irregularity Committee established by Board of Directors to investigate any irregularities and verify cases  Mandamus:




*  Publishes annual reports with description of  operations and activities of the year, and audited financial
statements. In addition, interim (quarterly) reports are also made public.
Independence of AMC:
Securum/Retriva:
. Publishes annual reports with description of operations and activities of the year, and audited financial
statements. In addition, interim (quarterly) reports are also made public.Restructuring Agency:
Annex Table 8: Legal Environment and Management of AMC
Country  Sunset Clause and if yes,  Broader Legal Environment in which AMC  Management of AMC and Quality  Funding of AMC
Example  was it honored  operated  and Renumeration of Staff
Finland  Arsenal:  Adequacy of bankruptcy and foreclosure law:  Arsenal:  Arsenal:
(91  -94)  . The Group's operations  *  Legal environment is adequate regarding bankruptcy  *  Professionally managed.  *  State provided Arsenal with FIM  22.8
(91 - 94)  are expected to continue  and foreclosure laws  billion in equity capital and has issued
until the end of the  *  Private sector wage scale.  No  guarantees totaling FIM 28 billion to
century.  Did AMC have any superpowers and if so what type of  performance related wages.  safeguard its funding.
super-powers
. No.  *  Moreover, Arsenal raised xxx in capital
markets.
Funding has been sufficient.
Especially, Arsenal had sufficient
equity capital to write down the loans
that were transferred at book value.
Ghana  *  Six years.  NPART was  Adequacy of bankruptcy  and foreclosure law:  *  Head of agency was a political  *  Funding from proceeds in the blocked
to have been closed  *  Legal framework was satisfactory; however,  appointee who was not selected for his  accounts of the Bank's adjustment
(82 - 89)  down by  end Dec.  application and implementation of the laws were  technical skills.  He had no prior  credit (FINSACI), bilateral grants,
1995.  appalling.  Contract disputes could take 3-6 years to  business experience.  proceeds from sale of acquired assets.
resolve.  To meet administrative expenditure,
*  On account of some  *  Internal problems arose due to the  NPART initially received budget
slackening in the pace  Did AMC have any superpowers and if so what type of  inexperienced timid, distracted  allocation for the first 2 years from the
of recovery by 1995,  super-powers:  leadership of NPART and its poor  Government through the grants or loan
and to enable NPART to  *  After NPART was established it became apparent that  relationship with the Ministry of  accounts.
wind up its residual  a backlog of court cases would hamper the  Finance and the central bank.
operations and to make  disposition of assets and the tribunal was formed  *  NPART had problems with funding its
collections for COOP  legally to circumvent the long delay if disposition  *  NPART received extensive technical  operations in its early days resulting in
bank (not included in  was left up to the courts.  assistance under FINSACI for  delays in bringing NPART staff on
the 1990 transfer), its  financing a team of expatriate experts,  board, acquiring computer hardware
mandate was extended  *  Thus, a special judicial  was set up outside of the court  two of whom had previous expenence  and software. With the backing of a
by 18 months.  It closed  system which only became operational I and % years  with the U.S. RTC.  These two experts  World Bank's FINSAC I, the problem
in June 1i997.  aftepr  NPART's crrepatiA  became NPART's  directors of  became  less ancnte.
Operations and Finance.  With the
locally recruited director of
administration, NPART's  middle
management was stronger than its top
administrator.  Also, many of the staff
were recruited from the banks.
*  NPART had an attractive salary
structure as it was exempt from the
limits imposed on public sector wages.
Staff were actually paid more than their
counterparts in the private banks.Annex  i avce a;  -egai  nuviromnent  anu  iviLanagement  OI A[V1k
Country  Sunset Clause and if yes,  Broader Legal Environment in which AMC  Management of AMC and Quality  Funding of AMC
Example  was it honored  operated  and Renumeration of Staff
Sweden  Securum/Retriva:  Adequacy  of bankruptcy  and  foreclosure  law  Securum:  Securum:
Expected  to operate  up  *  Legal environment  was  adequate  regarding  *  Professionally  managed.  *  Received  SEK 14  billion  in equity  and
(91 - 94)  to fifteen  years. Assets  bankruptcy  code  and foreclosure  laws.  SEK  10 billion  in loan guarantees.
were sold  faster  than  . Private  sector  pay scale  including  Nordbanken  provided  SEK  27 billion in
anticipated  as property  Did AMC have  any superpowers  and if so what type of  performance  related  bonuses. Generous  the  form of loans  at favorable  rates.
markets  and economy  as  super-powers  severance  packages  were  adopted  to
a whole  recovered  much  *  AMCs  had no special  legal powers  attract  high caliber  people.  Retriva:
faster.  Closed  down  *  Received  SEK  3.8 billion  and SEK  3.5
after 5 years  billion in guarantees.
*  In both cases, funding  was  sufficient.Restructuring Agency:
Annex Table 9:  The Asset Transfer Process
Country  Criteria for asset transfer and  Process  of Asset Transfer  Amount and Sectoral Breakdown of Assets transferred to AMC
Example  transfer price
Finland  Arsenal  Arsenal:  Amount of total asset transferred as percentage of total banking system assets/banking
*  Criteria for Transfer;  All NPLs  *  In terms of credit administration, clients were  system loans and percentage of GDP
(91 - 94)  without exception.  initially assessed by outside consultants and  Arsenal:
*  TTansfer Price: Transferred at  classified into viable and non-viable.  A client was  *  Gross value (1993): FIM 39.5 billion, or 5.2% of total banking assets (8.2% of GDP).
*  Tranfer  Prce:  Tansfered  at  considered to be viable if it could, through own
book value.  activities and with temporary support, develop a  *  After write-downs, 28 billion or 3.7% of total banking assets (5.8% of GDP)
profitable operation. Qualified clients would start a
corporate restructuring program to increase client  STS:
company's profitability in order to enable it to  *  Gross value FIM 3.4 billion, 0.51% of total banking assets (0.66%  of GDP).
return to the ordinary banking system.  Sectoral Breakdown of loans transferred to AMC
*  Arsenal assumed in 1993 real estate at a book
value that was substantially higher than the market  Arsenal:
value at the time.  To estimate the current market  *  Real Estate: 33.7%
value, external surveyors were assigned to perforn  *  Client receivables: 41%
a complete real estate portfolio valuation in 1994,
before process of management and liquidation took  *  Assets under management and other assets:25.3%
place.
Were any loans left in banks and if so amount and type (i. e. Ioans deemed unviable,
corporate loans etc)
. No.  Arsenal took responsibility for all non-performing loans and assets transferred
from SBF.
Ghana  *  Criteria for Transfer:  *  Central bank assumed the lead role in the  Amount of total asset transferred as percentage of total banking system assets/banking
Nontransparent as there were  acquisition process because NPART was not yet  system loans and percentage of GDP
(82 - 89)  no specific criteria developed.  operational.  *  About 13,000 accounts were transferred to NPART.
*  Transfer Price: Book value of  *  In theory, NPART evaluated and categorized  *  Loans transferred  amounted to C50 billion equivalent to 50.8% of total outstanding
assets excluding accrued  enterprises as nonviable or potentially viable, the  loans and 6% of GDP.
it  A  - Amnrehencive  due  latter ern  in heinrp  made  candidates for a cornorate ...  Ire----  - ---  ___1  - _11.1  ~~~~Sectoral  Breakdown of loans transterred to AMC
diligence exercise was not  restructuring program.  However, categorization
conducted on any of the assets  was done by N-part personnel and not via  ,  Corporate loans from state owned and private companies across the industrial and
subject to transfer to NPART.  independent thrid party review.  service sectors.  Some were backed by real estate, including houses, but most of the
Specifically, the central bank  loans were collateralized by plant, equipment and machinery.
restricted its efforts to  o  It  r  y  effort  wer  oused on the 250 largest  Were any loans left in banks and if so amount and type (i. e. loans deemed unviable,
validating the eligibility of  accounts representing 89% of the total non-
claims  and  tracking  ~~performiing  assets.  corporate loans etc)
movemens,  and  trckngYes.
movements, receipts and  *  NPART screened those accounts for classification
disbursements, interest and  into 4 categories: foreclosure, sale, workout/
other charges within the  restructuring and write-off.
accounts.Annex Table 9:  The Asset Transfer Process
Country  Criteria for asset transfer and  Process of Asset Transfer  Amount and Sectoral Breakdown of Assets transferred to AMC
Example  transfer price
Ghana  *  Following  the classification,  NPART  assigned  a
recovery  estimate,  in percentage  and amount  to
(82  - 89)  each  individual  account.
*  As part of normal  work-out  activities,  NPART's
staff performed  this function  as they received
extensive  training  from the expatriate  experts  on
loan workout,  asset appraisal,  property  inspections,
etc.. However,  its role  in corporate  restructuring
was limited.
Sweden  Securum/Retriva:  Securum/Retriva:  Amount  of total  asset transferred  as percentage  of total  banking  system  assets/banking
*  Criteria  for Transfer:  Mainly  *  Before  assets  were transferred  to AMCs,  they  had  system  loans  and  percentage  of GDP:
(91  94)  size  and complexity  of loan:  to go through  valuation  process  to assess  true  Securum:
only  loans over  SEK 15 million  market  value.  Grum:
were transferred,  and  they  *  Gross  value:SEK  67 billion,  4.4%  of total  banking  assets  (4.6%  of GDP).  After  write-
typically  consisted  of  *  One-off  process,  non-performing  assets  of  down: SEK  50 billion 3.3%  of total  banking  assets  ( 3.4%  of GDP).
corporations  with operations  in  Nordbanken  & Gota Bank  transferred  to Securum  Retriva:
several  countries  or  and Retriva,  respectively.  *  Gross  value SEK  45 billion  or 3.0.%  of banking  assets  (about  3.1%  of GDP). After
complicated  structures  in terns  write-down,  SEK  19.5  billion  or 1.3%%  of total  banking  assets  (1.4%  of GDP).
of subsidiaries.
Sectoral  Breakdown  of loans  transferred  to AMC
*  Transfer  Price:NPLs  were
transferred  at book value.  Securum:
*  Mostly  real estate  loans.
*  Private  AMCs:  NPLs
transferred  at market  value,  *  Loans: 91.1%.  Share  portfolio:  6.2%. Real Estate:  2.7%.
consisting  of loans  of parent
bank.  Retriva:
*  Loans: 86.2%.  Real  Estate: 12.3%.  Share  portfolio:  1.6%.
Were  any loans  left in banks  and  if so amount  and type (i. e. loans  deemed  unviable,
corporate  loans  etc)
Securum/Retriva:
*  All NPLs with  assessed  value under SEK 15  million,  or of low level of complexity
(i.e. mortgages,  consumer  credits) were  not transferred  to AMCs.
*  Banks were  left with  a ratio of bad loans  similar  to the one prevailing  in market.Restructuring Agency:
Annex Table 10: Process of Asset Disposition
Country  From Debt Restructuring to Asset Sale  Number, type and amount of  Assets sold and assets that
Example  loans forced into bankruptcy,  remain on books of AMC (as %
restructured  of total)
Finland  Was transfer a one-off process? Arsenal:  Transfer of assets was a one time event  . Of an initial portfolio of FIM  . Arsenal:  Total RE portfolio
11.4 billion corporate and  after write-downs was FIM 8.5
(91 - 94)  Criteria used for loan workout: Arsenal:  Loan goes through valuation process as in any regular bank.  private clients in  1993, 69% had  billion; by end 1997, Arsenal
Viability is determined on a case by case basis. A client is considered to be viable if it can, through own  been forced into bankruptcy by  had sold FIM 5.9 billion,  or
activities and with temporary support, develop a profitable operation.  June 1997  78.4%.
Instruments applied (partial debt write off, debt-to-equity swap, change of maturity) Mostly used debt-to-  *  31 % of initial portfolio had not  *  Market value of assets
equity swaps for restructuring.  been forced into bankruptcy.  Of  transferred amounted to FIM 28
Process of asset sale/disposition: Arsenal used negotiated sales method.  these 1.1 billion, or 9.8% of  billion.  At end 1997, FIM 13
initial portfolio were retumed  to  billion remained in Arsenal's
Purchaser of assets:  100% domestic  regular banking system  portfolio, equivalent to 46.5
Accumulated losses/profits:  percent.
Arsenal: Losses had reached over FIM 18 billion by the end of 1997, from original transfer of assets worth
39.5 billion.  This figure includes the acquisition of STS Ltd.
STS: Before being acquired by the Arsenal Group, STS had incurred in losses of FIM 2.5 billion against
total (face) value of assets originally transferred of about FIM 3.4 billion.
Ghana  Was transfer a one-off process? Yes  *  Initially, the staff  had to  . By June 30, 1997 when it was
determine the accuracy of the  closed down, NPART had
(82 - 89)  Criteria used for loan workout  loan records.  recovered a total amount of
*  Original idea was to restructure enterprises that were classified as viable. Criteria for loan work-out:  C19.61 billion or 32% of its
the default to the bank was not willful, capacity to revive and profitably operate (including managing)  . As of April 1993, the resolution  original portfolio of C59
the enterprise was assured, market prospects remained good, necessary working capital and other  of loans of 203 enterprises with  billion.).
required resources were available, conditions leading to the previous default or difficulties identified  debts of C38.45 billion (65% of
and properly addressed and recovery prospects remained good.  total NPART assets) was as  *  About C610 million were sold
follows:  outright with concurrence of the
. The Government commissioned a study to assess the magnitude and nature of corporate distress and  i.  foreclosures for 94 firms with  debtor.  (Equivalent  to 1% of
recommend a project to facilitate the restructuring of potentially viable enterprises.  The first phase of  C14.5 billion (37.7%);  the total portfolio of C59
the study which reviewed a sample of 214 firms concluded that a majority of them had good prospects  ii.  restructuring for 89 firms with  billion.)
for viable onerations if they undergo financial, technical and managerial restructuring.  The second  C  2 9 hillinn  (330):
phase examined the altemative institutional anrangements for the restructuring and recommended the  iii.  pay  offs at full/discounted
establishment of an investment bank to carry it out.  However, two new private merchant banks opened  value for 10 firms with C414
in 1990 in addition to a previously existing Merchant Bank and thus the proposal was rejected.  million;
In the end, enterprise restructuring became mired in political problems and assets were basically sold  iv.  write-offs for 3 firms with
off.  Cl.45 billion; and
v.  other for 7 firms with C9.2
Instruments applied (partial debt write off, debt-to-equity  swap, change of maturity)  billion (23.9%).
Process of asset sale/disposition:
. Negotiated sales. NPART advertised the assets subject to foreclosures in the local papers upon which
interested buyers approached NPART.
Purchaser of assets: Domestic investors mainly and some foreign investors purchased the assets of those
subject to foreclosures..AJWOI.1  J.IS  ALLLJ  115CXt11t  .
Annex Table 10: Process of Asset Disposition
Country  From Debt Restructuring to Asset Sale  Number, type and amount of  Assets sold and assets that
Example  loans forced into bankruptcy,  remain on books of AMC (as %
restructured  of total)
Ghana  Accumulated losses/profits: NPART recovered a total amount of C  19.61 billion, equivalent to 0.33 on every
(82-89)  Cedi.
Sweden  Was transfer a one-off process?  *  In most cases. Securum took  . Securum/Retriva: Assets sold:
Securum:  Transfer of assets was a one time event. Retriva:  Transfer of assets was a one time event.  over collateral and did not  SEK 57 billion or 86.3 of total
(91 - 94)  Securum/Retriva: Assets transferred to Retriva by Gota Bank, were acquired by Securum, by purchase of  restructure loans.  assets.  Assets remaining on
Retriva from the State for SEK 3.8 billion.  books: SEK 9 billion or 13.6 of
total assets, as of June 1997.
Criteria used for loan workout:  These assets are presently held
Securum/Retriva:  All assets were valued on a case by case basis.  Cash flow analysis would determine if  by Venantius AB.
the asset was worth restructuring or liquidating.  Exception for equitable treatment in this process: for cases
where labor market considerations prevailed.
Securum used three different divestment altematives:
*  Installment plans, with or without concession, depending on customer solvency.
*  Reconstruction plan, when business in question had a good chance of surviving.
*  Taking over of collateral.
In most cases, taking over collateral proved to be only financially viable altemative.
Management of Assets:
*  Asset enhancement, for example attempts to leave vacant space.
Instruments applied (partial debt write off, debt-to-equity swap, change of maturity): Mostly debt to equity
swap.
Process of asset sale/disposition: When asset value could no longer be significantly enhanced through active
management, and Securum was able to obtain a sales price that corresponded to its target value, it sold the
asset.
Purchaser of assets: Secururn/Retriva: Domestic and foreign (Breakdown NA).
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